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Executive summary
The regulatory control of nuclear materials (nuclear safeguards) is a prerequisite for 
the peaceful use of nuclear energy in Finland. In order to uphold the Finnish part of the 
international agreements on nuclear non-proliferation – mainly the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty (NPT) – this regulatory control is exercised by the Nuclear Materials Section of the 
Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK).
The results of STUK'’s nuclear safeguards inspection activities in 2014 continued to 
demonstrate that the Finnish licence holders take good care of their nuclear materials. 
There were no indications of undeclared nuclear materials or activities and the inspected 
materials and activities were in accordance with the licence holders’ declarations.  
Safeguards are applied to nuclear materials and activities that can lead to the proliferation 
of nuclear weapons. These safeguards include nuclear materials accountancy, control, 
security and the reporting of nuclear fuel cycle-related activities. The main parties involved 
in a state nuclear safeguards system are the facilities that use nuclear materials – often 
referred to as “licence holders” or “operators” – and the state authority. A licence holder 
shall take good care of its nuclear materials and the state authority shall provide the 
regulatory control to ensure that the licence holder fulfils the requirements. The control 
of nuclear expert organisations, technology holders and suppliers, to ensure the non-
proliferation of sensitive technology, is also a growing global challenge for all stakeholders. 
In Finnish legislation, all these stakeholders are dealt with as users of nuclear energy. At 
then end of 2013, the new STUK regulations – called YVL Guides – entered into force. All 
the stakeholders were requested to prepare their safeguards manuals as a part of their 
quality managements systems. The approval process will continue in 2015.
Finland has quite significant nuclear power production, but the related nuclear industry 
is rather limited. Most of the declared nuclear materials (uranium, plutonium) in Finland 
reside at the nuclear power plants in Olkiluoto and Loviisa. Additionally, there is the 
research reactor in Espoo, as well as a dozen minor nuclear material holders in Finland. 
Nuclear dual-use items and instrumentation for the third reactor under construction at 
the Olkiluoto site are being imported and installed. The import licences are reviewed as 
applicable to ensure the peaceful use of the technology. The International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) and the European Commission made their site visits to the construction 
site prior to the installation of safeguards instrumentation and fuel delivery.
The planning and design of the fourth reactor at the Olkiluoto power plant and at a new 
nuclear power plant site Hanhikivi in Pyhäjoki were authorised in 2010. The safeguards 
systems for these new reactors will be designed together with facility design and 
development. Similarly to the Olkiluoto 3 reactor that is under construction, the import 
licences for the new facilities are reviewed as applicable to ensure the peaceful use of 
the technology and sensitive information. The operators have submitted the preliminary 
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Basic Technical Characteristics to the European Commission and obtained Material 
Balance Area codes for the future reactors before the vendor companies were selected. In 
December 2013, Fennovoima announced that the Hanhikivi reactor will be supplied by 
Rusatom Overseas. This was not included as an option in the application of 2009, and thus 
the re-evaluation of the conditions for the previous authorisation was carried out in 2014, 
resulting in new Decision-in-Principle endorsed by the Parliament in December 2014. 
In parallel with this, the TVO application to extend the time line for the fourth unit was 
denied by the Government. Owing to these decisions, the construction licence applications 
are expected in 2015.
Uranium production as one of the by-products of nickel at the Talvivaara mine was given 
approval from the Government in accordance with the nuclear energy legislation in March 
2012. In 2013, the company constructed the uranium extraction plant, but the Supreme 
Administrative Court rescinded the approval, owing to claims of environmental and 
economical issues in December 2013 before the commissioning of the plant. The difficulties 
continued in 2014; and, finally in November 2014 the Talvivaara Sotkamo Ltd. filed for 
bankruptcy.  Currently, uranium residuals are extracted from the nickel at Harjavalta 
Nickel Refinery and at Freeport Cobalt in Kokkola, and reported to STUK.
STUK maintains a central national nuclear materials accountancy system and verifies 
that nuclear activities in Finland are carried out in accordance with the Finnish Nuclear 
Energy Act and Decree, European Union legislation and international agreements. These 
tasks are performed to guarantee that Finland can assure itself and the international 
community of the absence of undeclared nuclear activities and materials. In addition to 
this, the IAEA evaluates the success of the state safeguards system, and the European 
Commission participates in safeguarding the materials under its jurisdiction.
The number of the routine inspection days of the international inspectorates has been 
reduced significantly due to the state-level integrated safeguards approach for Finland, 
which has been in force since 2008. The number of international inspection days per 
year is approximately 25. Neither the IAEA nor the Commission made any remarks nor 
did they present any required actions based on their inspections during 2014. By means 
of their nuclear materials accountancy and control systems, all licence holders enabled 
STUK to fulfil its own obligations under the international agreements relevant to nuclear 
safeguards. STUK continues with 40 annual inspections and 60 inspection days. In 2014, 
the number in inspection days was significantly higher owing to the extensive survey 
campaign carried out at Onkalo, the planned geological repository. In total, 65 working 
days were required for the one-week long scanning of the tunnels.
The application for the construction licence for the disposal facility, which consists of 
the encapsulation plant and the geological repository, was submitted to the government 
in December 2012. The licensing of the facility was one of the main topics over the year 
as a whole at STUK. During 2013 and 2014, the IAEA and the Commission defined the 
requirements for the safeguards equipment for the encapsulation plant in an interactive 
process with STUK and Posiva. This document will be included in the STUK statement to 
be finalised in 2015.
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The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) is one of the elements of the 
global nuclear non-proliferation effort. STUK has two roles in relation to the CTBT: 
STUK operates the Finnish National Data Centre (FiNDC) and one of the radionuclide 
laboratories (RL07) in the CTBT International Monitoring Network (IMS). The main task 
of the FiNDC is to inspect data received from the International Monitoring System and 
to inform the national authority, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, about any indications of 
a nuclear weapons test. The FiNDC falls under the non-proliferation process in STUK’s 
organisation, together with the regulatory control of nuclear materials.
A major goal of all current CTBT-related activities is the entry into force of the CTBT itself. 
An important prerequisite for such positive political action is that the verification system 
of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) is functioning and 
able to provide assurance to all parties that it is impossible to make a clandestine nuclear 
test without detection. The FiNDC is committed to its own role in the common endeavour, 
so that the verification system of the CTBTO can accomplish its detection task.
The human resources development at the Nuclear Materials Section during 2014 was 
focused on nuclear material control: in particular, information security issues were 
addressed. This was partly due to the need to regulate the construction of the final disposal 
facility for spent nuclear fuel at the Olkiluoto repository site. 
In addition, STUK contributed to educational workshops and training courses for 
authorities who represent nuclear newcomers: countries that aim at uranium production 
or nuclear power in cooperation with the IAEA. STUK and Finnish Customs continued the 
joint multi-year border monitoring development project. The project covers customs officers 
training as well as the updating of technical equipment and of operational procedures. In 
2014, the partnerships programme between King Abdullah City for Atomic and Renewable 
Energy (K.A.CARE), Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and STUK began supporting Saudi Arabia’s 
nuclear energy programme. In the field of safeguards and nuclear security, STUK’s 
safeguards and security experts initiated practical cooperation with their colleagues at 
K.A.CARE.
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The regulatory control of nuclear materials is a 
prerequisite for the peaceful use of nuclear energy 
in Finland. In order for Finland to have nuclear 
industry, most of which consists of nuclear energy 
production, it must be ensured that nuclear ma-
terials, equipment and technology are used only 
for their declared peaceful purposes. The basis for 
nuclear safeguards is the national system for the 
regulatory control of nuclear materials and ac-
tivities. Nuclear safeguards represent an integral 
part of nuclear safety and nuclear security and 
are applied to both large- and medium-size nu-
clear industry and to small-scale nuclear material 
activities. Along with the safeguards, the regula-
tory process for nuclear non-proliferation includes 
transport control, export control, border control, 
international cooperation, and monitoring compli-
ance with the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban 
Treaty (CTBT).
In Finland, STUK is the competent author-
ity with regard to the implementation of nuclear 
non-proliferation. In November 2012, a new STUK 
strategy for the period 2013–2017 was announced, 
and the organisation was renewed to support the 
implementation of the new strategy. This does not 
considerably affect the mandatory implementation 
of non-proliferation control at STUK, but it pro-
vides a good framework for the interaction between 
nuclear safety, security and safeguards. Parallel to 
this, STUK regulations were under renewal and 
were finally issued on 1 December 2013. In the new 
STUK safeguards regulation, the requirements con-
cerning nuclear material accountancy, safeguards-
based procedures and the implementation of the 
Additional Protocol are being merged in one up-
dated regulation, the regulatory Guide  YVL D.1 
“Regulatory Control of Nuclear Safeguards”. This 
1 Nuclear non-proliferation 
implementation in Finland
instructs all stakeholders in the Finnish nuclear 
field in how to comply with the current national and 
international safeguards regulations. During 2014, 
the licence holders were obliged to review their 
manuals and evaluate how the requirements can 
be implemented. At the outset of 2015, STUK will 
make decisions on the implementation practices.
1.1 International safeguards 
agreements and national legislation
Nuclear safeguards are based on international 
agreements, the most important and extensive of 
which is the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons (Non-Proliferation Treaty, NPT). 
The Treaty Establishing the European Atomic 
Energy Community (Euratom Treaty) is the basis 
for the nuclear safeguards system of the European 
Union (EU). Finland is bound by both of these 
treaties, and also has several bilateral agreements 
in the area of the peaceful use of nuclear energy. 
When Finland joined the EU, the bilateral agree-
ments with Australia, Canada and the USA were 
partly substituted with the corresponding Euratom 
agreements (see Appendix 3 for the relevant legis-
lation).
Finland was the first state where an 
INFCIRC¹/153-type comprehensive nuclear Safe-
guards Agreement with the IAEA entered into 
force (INFCIRC/155, 9 February 1972). When 
Finland joined the EU (1 January 1995), this 
agreement was suspended and subsequently the 
Safeguards Agreement between the non-nuclear 
weapon Member States of the EU, the Euratom 
and the IAEA (INFCIRC/193) entered into force 
in Finland, on 1 October 1995. Finland signed the 
¹  INFCIRC = IAEA Information Circulars
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Additional Protocol (AP) to the INFCIRC/193 in 
Vienna on 22 September 1998 with the other EU 
Member States, and ratified it on 8 August 2000. 
The Additional Protocol entered into force on 30 
April 2004, once all the EU Member States had 
ratified it. The scope and mandate for Euratom 
nuclear safeguards are defined in the European 
Commission Regulation No. 302/2005.
After Finland joined the EU as a Member State 
and thereby obligated itself to the Euratom nuclear 
safeguards, a comprehensive national safeguards 
system was still maintained and further developed. 
The basic motivation for this is the responsibil-
ity assumed by Finland for its nuclear safeguards 
and nuclear security under the obligations of the 
NPT, and also to ensure fulfilment of the Euratom 
requirements.
The national nuclear safeguards derive their 
mandate and scope from the Finnish Nuclear 
Energy Act and Decree. These were amended dur-
ing 2008 as a result of the general constitution-
based renewal of the Finnish nuclear legislation 
system. The operator’s obligation to have a nu-
clear material accountancy system and the right 
of STUK to oversee the planning and generation 
of design information for new facilities was intro-
duced from STUK regulations to the Decree.
As stipulated by the Act, STUK issues detailed 
regulations on safety, security and safeguards (the 
YVL Guides) that apply to the use of nuclear energy. 
STUK’s safeguards requirements for all users of 
nuclear energy during all phases of the nuclear fuel 
cycle are set in Guide YVL D.1 “Regulatory Control 
of Nuclear Safeguards”. Areas covered include 
the obligations and measures stemming from the 
Additional Protocol for the Safeguards Agreement 
and recent developments. All stakeholders must de-
scribe their own safeguards system in written form 
(as a nuclear materials handbook or safeguards 
manual), in order to ease their task of fulfilling 
their obligations and to guarantee the effective and 
comprehensive operation of the national safeguards 
system. In the new guide, there are also specific 
national requirements for the final disposal of spent 
nuclear fuel in a geological repository. 
The new Guide YVL D.1 “Regulatory Control 
of Nuclear Safeguards” entered into force on 1 
December 2013. Nuclear safeguards control ap-
plies to:
•	 nuclear	 material	 (special	 fissionable	 material	
and source material)
•	 nuclear	dual-use	items	(non-nuclear	materials,	
components, equipment and technology suitable 
for producing nuclear energy or nuclear weap-
ons as specified in INFCIRC/254, Part 1)
•	 licence	 holders’	 activities,	 expertise,	 prepared-
ness and competence
•	 R&D	and	other	activities	related	to	the	nuclear	
fuel cycle as defined in the Additional Protocol
•	 design	 and	 construction	 of	 new	 nuclear	 facili-
ties.
1.2 Parties of the Finnish nuclear 
safeguards system
The main parties involved in the Finnish nuclear 
safeguards system are the authorities and licence 
holders. Undistributed responsibility for the safety, 
security and safeguards of the use of nuclear ener-
gy is on the licence holder. It is the responsibility of 
STUK as the competent state authority to ensure 
that the licence holders and all other stakeholders 
in the nuclear field comply with the requirements 
of the law and the nuclear safeguards agreements. 
To complement the national effort, international 
control is necessary in order to demonstrate cred-
ibility and the proper functioning of the national 
safeguards system.
1.2.1 Ministries
The Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MFA) is responsi-
ble for national non-proliferation policy and inter-
national agreements. The MFA is responsible for 
the export licensing of nuclear materials and other 
nuclear dual-use items, including sensitive nuclear 
technology. The Ministry of Employment and the 
Economy (MEE) is the highest authority for the 
management and control of nuclear energy. MEE 
is responsible for the legislation related to nuclear 
energy and is also the competent authority men-
tioned in the Euratom Treaty. Other ministries as 
well, such as the Ministry of the Interior and the 
Ministry of Defence, contribute to the efficient func-
tioning of the national nuclear safeguards system.
1.2.2 STUK
As per the Finnish nuclear legislation, STUK is 
responsible for maintaining the national nuclear 
safeguards system in order to prevent the prolif-
eration of nuclear weapons. STUK regulates the 
licence holders’ activities and ensures that the 
obligations of international agreements concern-
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ing the peaceful use of nuclear materials are met. 
Regulatory control by STUK includes the posses-
sion, use, production, transfer (national and inter-
national), handling, storage, transport, export and 
import of nuclear materials and nuclear dual-use 
items. STUK is in charge of Finland’s approval 
and consultation process for IAEA and European 
Commission inspectors. STUK approves an inspec-
tor as long as there are no such issues related to 
the person in question that may adversely affect 
nuclear safety or security at Finnish facilities or 
the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The new 
inspector requests are sent for comments to the op-
erators that hold construction or operating licences 
for nuclear facilities. If STUK cannot approve an 
inspector, it assigns the approval process to the 
Ministry of Employment and the Economy.
Nuclear safeguards by the Nuclear Materials 
Section of STUK cover all typical measures of a 
State System of Accounting for and Control of 
Nuclear Materials (SSAC), together with many 
other activities. STUK reviews the licence hold-
ers’ reports (operational notifications, inventory 
reports), inspects their accountancy, facilities and 
transport arrangements on site, and performs sys-
tem audits. Office work constitutes 90% of the 
inspection effort. Most of the working hours are 
invoiced to the users of nuclear energy (see Figure 
12) for the distribution of the compiled work-
ing days). STUK runs a verification programme 
for nuclear activities to assess the completeness 
and correctness of the declarations by the licence 
holders. Nuclear safeguards on the national level 
are closely linked with other functions of nuclear 
materials control and non-proliferation: licensing, 
export control, border control, transport control, 
combating illicit trafficking, physical protection 
of nuclear materials, and monitoring compliance 
with the Comprehensive Nuclear -Test-Ban Treaty 
(CTBT). Nuclear safety and particularly nuclear 
security objectives are closely complemented by 
safeguards objectives. For this reason, the re-
search, development and regulatory units in the 
fields of safety, security and safeguards at STUK 
cooperate under the non-proliferation framework. 
STUK issued a new strategy and consequently a 
matrix organisation in 2013. The scope of non-pro-
liferation work of the Nuclear Materials Sections 
is linked with many organisational units of STUK 
(Fig. 1). In the organisation, the competences in 
 
Director General
Radiation Nuclear Environmental Nuclear 
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practices 
regulation
reactor 
regulation
radiation 
surveillance
waste and 
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Emergency Preparedness 
N l S ituc ear ecur y
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Expert services 
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Implementation of
non-proliferation
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in Finland
and internationally
Figure 1. Non-proliferation framework covers most of the operational areas of STUK.
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non-proliferation control were split into several 
organisational units. Only the core competences 
were maintained in the Nuclear Materials Section 
of the Nuclear Waste and Material Regulation. 
Consequently, interaction and cooperation between 
the reorganised units have been activated.
1.2.3 Licence holders and other 
users of nuclear energy
The essential parts of the national nuclear safe-
guards system are the licence holders and other 
users of nuclear energy – in nuclear terminology, 
often called the operators and other stakeholders. 
In the Finnish legislation, the term “use of nu-
clear energy” comprises a wide range of nuclear-
related activities, e.g. those defined in the Addition 
Protocol.  These stakeholders, in particular the 
license holders, perform key functions in the na-
tional safeguards system: control of the authentic 
source data of their nuclear materials in addition 
to accountancy for nuclear materials at the facil-
ity level for each of their material balance areas 
(MBA). Each licence holder or other user of nuclear 
energy must operate its safeguards system in ac-
cordance with its own nuclear materials handbook 
or safeguards manual. The requirements of the 
Additional Protocol are integrated in the hand-
book to facilitate safeguards-based implementation 
Table 1. Status of regulatory documents for material balance areas in Finland at the end of 2014.
MBA, 
location
BTC,  
last upd.
Site (AP), 
founded
PSP, in force FA, in force Licence/DiP, in force  
(from/until)
SG Manual,  
approved
WL0V, 
Loviisa
31.1.2012 S SF L0V1, 
8.7.2004
Yes, 4.5.1998 No Operation, LO1 until 31.12.2027 
LO2 until 31.12.2030
Yes, 30.11.2012
W0L1, 
Olkiluoto
9.4.2014 S SF 0LK1, 
8.7.2004
Yes, 7.6.2007 No Operation, until 31.12.2018 Yes, 4.12.2012
W0L2, 
Olkiluoto
9.4.2014 S SF 0LK1, 
8.7.2004
Yes, 7.6.2007 No Operation, until 31.12.2018 Yes, 4.12.2012
W0LS, 
Olkiluoto
24.9.2013 S SF 0LK1, 
8.7.2004
Yes, 7.6.2007 No Operation, until 31.12.2018 Yes, 4.12.2012
W0L3, 
Olkiluoto
11.4.2013 S SF 0LK1, 
8.7.2004
No No Construction, granted 17.2.2005 Yes, 4.12.2012
W0L4, 
Olkiluoto
12.11.2012 
(prel. DI)
S SF 0LK1, 
8.7.2004 (add. 
2013)
No No DiP, 1.7.2010 No
W0LE, 
Olkiluoto
27.5.2014 S SF POS1, 
31.3.2010
No No DiP, 1.7.2010 (last upd.) No
W0LF, 
Olkiluoto
17.9.2014 S SF POS1, 
31.3.2010
No No DiP, 1.7.2010 (last upd.) Yes, 13.6.2014
WFV1, 
Pyhäjoki
4.7.2013 
(prel. DI)
No No No DiP, 1.7.2010 No
WRRF, 
Espoo
31.12.2014 S SF VTT1, 
8.7.2004
Yes, 9.7.1998 No Operation, until 31.12.2023 Yes, 31.3.2011
WFRS, 
Helsinki
10.4.2014 S SF STUK, 
8.7.2004
No No Not required (for STUK) Prepared in 2014
WHEL, 
Helsinki
8.11.2006 S SF HYRL, 
8.7.2004
No No Operation, until 31.12.2017 Prepared in 2014
WKK0, 
Kokkola
30.5.2013 No No No Operation, until 31.12.2019 Prepared in 2014
WNNH, 
Harja-
valta
16.11.2010 No No No Operation, until 31.12.2019 Prepared in 2014
WTAL, 
Talvivaara
29.11.2010 No No No No No, drafted in 2013
WDPJ, 
Jyväskylä
14.5.2012 No No No Operation, until 31.12.2024 Prepared in 2014
MBA (material balance code), BTC (Basic Technical Characteristics, i.e. Design Information), AP (the Additional Protocol), PSP (Particular Safeguards Provisions set 
by the European Commission), FA (Facility Attachment prepared by the IAEA), DiP (Decision-in-Principle, date of Parliament approval, in force 5 years). 
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Figure 3. Plutonium in spent nuclear fuel in Finland in 1996–2014.
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Figure 2. Uranium accumulation in Finland in 1996–2014.
at the site, including the material balance areas. 
Other stakeholders too, as users of nuclear en-
ergy, are requested to have a safeguards manual to 
facilitate safeguards implementation. The nuclear 
materials handbook or safeguards manual is a part 
of the operator’s quality system and is reviewed 
and approved by STUK.
With the basic technical characteristics (BTC) 
submitted by a licence holder or by other stake-
holder as groundwork, the European Commission 
adopts particular safeguards provisions (PSP) for 
that licence holder. PSPs are drawn taking op-
erational and technical constraints into account 
in close consultation with both the person or un-
dertaking concerned and the relevant member 
state. Until PSPs are adopted, the person or un-
dertaking shall apply the general provisions of the 
Commission regulation No 302/2005. A facility at-
tachment (FA) is prepared in cooperation with the 
IAEA for each facility to describe arrangements 
specific to that facility. Status of the regulatory 
documents for the Finnish material balance areas 
is shown in Table 1.
A total of 99.8% of all nuclear materials in 
Finland reside at the nuclear power plants (NPP). 
The amounts of nuclear materials (uranium, plu-
tonium) in Finland in 1996–2014 are presented in 
Figures 2 and 3.
Fortum (MBA WL0V)
Fortum is a partly state-owned energy company, 
one of the largest in the Nordic countries. Fortum 
operates power plants of several types including 
nuclear.
The nuclear power plant operated by Fortum 
Power and Heat is located on the Hästholmen 
Island in Loviisa on the southeast coast of Finland. 
This first NPP to have been built in Finland hosts 
14
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two VVER-440 type power reactor units, with a cur-
rent net electrical output of 496 MW for each of the 
units, Loviisa 1 and Loviisa 2. Loviisa 1 started its 
electricity production in 1977 and Loviisa 2 in 1980. 
These two units share common fresh and spent 
fuel storages. For nuclear safeguards accountancy 
purposes, the entire NPP is counted as one material 
balance area (MBA code WL0V). The electricity gen-
erated by the Loviisa NPP constitutes about 10% of 
electrical production in Finland as a whole.
Most of the fuel for the Loviisa NPP has been im-
ported from the Soviet Union/Russian Federation. 
The spent fuel of the Loviisa NPP was returned 
to the Soviet Union/Russian Federation until 1996 
and since then has been stored in the interim stor-
age due to a change in Finnish nuclear legislation, 
which currently forbids, the import and export of 
nuclear waste in general, including spent fuel.
As per the requirements of the Additional 
Protocol, the Loviisa NPP site (SSFLOV1) com-
prises Hästholmen Island as a whole and extends 
to the main gate on the mainland. Particular 
Safeguards Provisions for the Loviisa NPP, which 
define the European Commission’s nuclear safe-
guards procedures for the facility, have been in 
force since 1998. The Facility Attachment of the 
Safeguards Agreement INFCIRC/193 has not been 
prepared for the Loviisa NPP.
Teollisuuden Voima (MBAs W0L1, 
W0L2, W0LS, W0L3 and W0L4)
Teollisuuden Voima Oyj (TVO) owns and oper-
ates a nuclear power plant on the Olkiluoto Island 
in Eurajoki on the west coast of Finland. The 
Olkiluoto NPP consists of two nuclear power re-
actor units, Olkiluoto 1 and Olkiluoto 2, and an 
interim spent fuel storage. Olkiluoto 1 was con-
nected to the electricity grid in 1978 and Olkiluoto 
2 in 1980. These units have been upgraded to the 
current output of 880 MW. The Olkiluoto NPP is 
responsible for about 17% of all electricity produc-
tion in Finland. There are three active material 
balance areas (MBA codes W0L1, W0L2, W0LS) at 
the Olkiluoto NPP.
Presently, the uranium in TVO’s nuclear fuel 
is mainly of Australian, Canadian and Russian 
origin. This uranium is enriched in the Russian 
Federation or in the EU, and the fuel assemblies 
are manufactured in Spain and Sweden.
The Finnish Government granted a licence for 
constructing a new nuclear reactor, Olkiluoto 3, 
on 17 February 2005. As a part of the licensing 
process, TVO’s plan for arranging the necessary 
measures to prevent the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons was approved by STUK. The construction 
and assembly work of the reactor unit is under 
way. The European Commission has assigned the 
MBA code W0L3 for Olkiluoto 3. 
The decisions for new nuclear facilities were 
granted by the government on 6 May 2010. One of 
these was the Olkiluoto 4 reactor. The selection of 
the vendor and the supply organisation will take 
place in the near future. Although the reactor type 
has not been specified yet, TVO submitted the pre-
liminary basic technical characteristics (BTC) in 
November 2012 in order to obtain the MBA code 
W0L4 for future correspondence.
TVO owns most of the area of the Olkiluoto 
Island, but the NPP site (SSFOLK1) as per the 
requirements of the Additional Protocol currently 
comprises the fenced areas around the reactor 
units, the spent fuel storage and the storage for low 
and intermediate level waste, and the Olkiluoto 3 
construction site. Particular Safeguards Provisions 
for the Olkiluoto NPP have been in force since 
2007. The Facility Attachment of the Safeguards 
Agreement INFCIRC/193 has not been prepared 
for the Olkiluoto NPP.
Fennovoima (MBA WFV1) 
Fennovoima was founded in 2007 to be a new nucle-
ar power operator in Finland. Fennovoima started 
preparatory works with several vendor candidates 
for this purpose and submitted its application for a 
nuclear power plant in 2009. The Government ap-
proved a Decisions-in-Principle in 2010 for the new 
operator Fennovoima to construct a new nuclear 
power plant at a new site. The applicant was re-
quested to submit its nuclear construction licence 
application within five years and to submit a plan 
for its nuclear waste management within six years. 
The preliminary Basic Technical Characteristics 
(BTC) was submitted to the European Commission 
in summer 2013, and the MBA code WFV1 was as-
signed to the future material balance area once the 
selection of the future Hanhikivi site at Pyhäjoki 
was decided. However, after negotiations with the 
original vendors and a new candidate, Fennovoima 
announced on 21 December 2013 that the plant 
supplier would be Rusatom Overseas. Owing to the 
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changes in ownership and reactor type described 
in the ratified application, a reassessment of the 
Decision-in-Principle was initiated in 2013. The 
reassessment was completed on 5 December 2014 
when the Parliament endorsed the Decision-in-
Principle of 2010 for the different reactor type, 
with a requirement for reasonable domestic owner-
ship. The Hanhikivi site will be declared stepwise 
as the construction proceeds from a virgin green 
site to the nuclear power plant.
VTT FiR1 research reactor (MBA WRRF)
Small amounts of nuclear materials are located 
at facilities other than nuclear power plants. The 
most significant of those facilities is the VTT re-
search reactor FiR1 (MBA code WRRF), located in 
Otaniemi, Espoo. The research reactor was the first 
nuclear reactor built in Finland at the Technical 
Research Centre of Finland (VTT). It reached criti-
cality on 27 March 1962. On 12 July 2012, the 
Ministry of Employment and the Economy and 
VTT announced the plan to close down the reactor 
and to launch the decommissioning process. A new 
building, the VTT Centre for Nuclear Safety, for ex-
perimental nuclear research will, however, be built 
at the Espoo premises of VTT. The preliminary 
BTC for the new building, already under construc-
tion, was submitted to the Commission by the end 
of 2014.  Both these decisions will have long-last-
ing effects, due to the need for permits, contracts 
and environmental impact assessment. This also 
affects safeguards, as the nuclear materials must 
be kept under the control of competent personnel 
at both facilities.
Particular Safeguards Provisions that define 
the European Commission’s nuclear safeguards 
procedures for the facility have been in force for 
VTT FiR1 from 1998. The Facility Attachment of 
the Safeguards Agreement INFCIRC/193 has not 
been prepared for the research reactor.
The VTT FiR1 site (SSFVTT1), as per the re-
quirements of the Additional Protocol, consists of 
the whole building around the research reactor, 
though there are non-nuclear companies and uni-
versity premises in the same building.
STUK (MBA WFRS)
Small quantities of nuclear materials are stored 
by the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority 
(STUK) – mainly materials no longer in use and 
hence taken into STUK’s custody. STUK was 
founded in 1958 and has been located at its cur-
rent premises in Roihupelto, Helsinki since 1994. 
The STUK MBA (WFRS) consists of the STUK 
headquarters and the “Central interim storage for 
small-user radioactive waste” at the Olkiluoto NPP 
site.
The STUK site (SSFSTUK), as per the re-
quirements of the Additional Protocol, consists of 
the premises of STUK’s headquarters located in 
Helsinki. The storage at Olkiluoto is included in 
the NPP’s site declaration.
The University of Helsinki, Laboratory 
of Radiochemistry (MBA WHEL)
The Laboratory of Radiochemistry at the University 
of Helsinki (HYRL) uses small amounts of nuclear 
materials. HYRL is located at the Kumpula univer-
sity campus in Helsinki.
The HYRL site (SSFHYRL), as per the require-
ments of the Additional Protocol, comprises the 
whole building that hosts the laboratory.
Freeport Cobalt Oy (MBA WKK0)
The by-products of the Kokkola Chemicals facil-
ity’s cobalt purification process contain uranium, 
which qualifies these by-products as nuclear mate-
rial. Thus, the Kokkola Chemicals has an operat-
ing licence to produce, store and handle nuclear 
material.	 In	 2013,	 Freeport-McMoRan	 Copper	 &	
Gold Inc acquired the ownership of the OM Group. 
The operator is Freeport Cobalt Oy, and the facility 
is located in Kokkola on the west coast of Finland.
Norilsk Nickel Harjavalta (MBA WNNH)
Norilsk Nickel Harjavalta Oy operates the nickel 
refining plant at Harjavalta in western Finland. 
The plant was commissioned in 1959, expanded 
in 1995 and again in 2002. Norilsk Nickel Finland 
became a part of the Russian-based Norilsk Nickel 
as a result of the OM Group’s nickel business ac-
quisition in 2007. The refinery of Norilsk Nickel 
Harjavalta employs a technique of sulphuric acid 
leaching of nickel products. Uranium residuals will 
be extracted from the nickel products, e.g., from the 
Talvivaara mine. In March 2010, STUK granted a 
licence to extract less than 10 tonnes of uranium 
per year. The Norilsk Nickel Harjavalta company 
submitted the basic technical characteristics (BTC) 
to the European Commission in December 2010. 
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Talvivaara Sotkamo Ltd. (MBA WTAL)
On 9 February 2010, the Talvivaara Sotkamo Ltd 
mining company announced its interest in inves-
tigating the recovery of uranium as a separate 
product from its sulphide ore body. The environ-
mental impact assessment was carried out in 2010 
and, according to nuclear energy legislation; the 
licence to recover uranium was granted by the 
government in March 2012. The Basic Technical 
Characteristics (BTC) were submitted to the 
European Commission in 2010, and the MBA code 
WTAL is assigned to the future uranium extrac-
tion plant that is constructed as a separate part 
of the mineral processing plant. The production 
of uranium was expected to commence in 2013. 
However, the claims concerning the uranium ex-
traction licence were approved by the Supreme 
Administrative Court on 5 December 2013, and the 
processing of the licence application to extract ura-
nium was returned to the government. Moreover, 
Talvivaara Sotkamo Ltd filed for bankruptcy on 
6 November 2014. The consequences are not yet 
known, but near-future progress is not foreseen to 
include uranium production.
Other nuclear material holders
There are about ten minor nuclear material hold-
ers in Finland. One of them is an actual mate-
rial balance area: the University of Jyväskylä, 
Department of Physics (JYFL, MBA code WDPJ), 
but in fact the nuclear material at JYFL has 
been derogated and exempted by the European 
Commission and the IAEA. Other minor nuclear 
material holders are members of a Catch-All-MBA 
(CAM), for the purposes of international nuclear 
safeguards. Most of these have depleted uranium 
as radiation-shielding material.
Posiva (MBAs W0LE and W0LF)
Posiva Oy is the company responsible for the fi-
nal disposal of spent nuclear fuel in Finland. It 
is owned by TVO and Fortum. Posiva has been 
excavating an underground rock characterisation 
facility called Onkalo at Eurajoki since 2004, and 
thus preparing for the construction of the final 
disposal facility. While neither a nuclear licence 
holder nor a nuclear material holder yet, Posiva 
and its activities are highly relevant to the na-
tional safeguards system, because Posiva is seen 
as developing a new type of facility, the geologi-
cal repository, where the nuclear material cannot 
be re-verified once it has been encapsulated and 
emplaced. In the IAEA safeguards approaches, it 
has been suggested that the geological formation 
should be under safeguards during the whole life-
time of the underground facility. For this reason, 
Posiva has been required to develop a non-pro-
liferation handbook, such as a nuclear materials 
handbook, to describe its safeguards procedures 
and reporting system already before becoming a 
nuclear material holder. By the end of 2012, Posiva 
submitted an application to the government to con-
struct the final disposal facility, which will consist 
of the encapsulation plant and the geological re-
pository. Based on the updated drawings in the 
application, the preliminary BTCs were prepared 
for both facilities separately and submitted to the 
Commission on 27 June 2013. The MBA codes as-
signed for the future facilities are W0LE for the 
encapsulation plant and W0LF for the geological 
repository. As the geological repository will be un-
der continuous development, it has been suggested 
that the BTC for the underground part will be up-
dated annually. However, the Facility Attachments 
of the Safeguards Agreement INFCIRC/193 have 
not been prepared for these new facilities. The in-
stallation without nuclear materials but having 
the two BTCs for these future Material Balance 
Areas constitutes a site according to the Additional 
Protocol. The Posiva site (SSFPOS1) covers the 
fenced area around the buildings supporting the 
construction of the facilities.
Other stakeholders
Nuclear expert organisations, technology holders 
and suppliers that serve nuclear and other indus-
try are obliged to take care that non-proliferation 
sensitive technology does not get into the hands 
of unauthorised actors and thereby contribute 
to nuclear proliferation. The introduction of the 
Additional Protocol (1996) extended the scope of 
safeguards to the non-proliferation control of nu-
clear programmes and fuel cycle-related activities. 
These also include research and development ac-
tivities not involving nuclear materials, but are 
related to process or system development of fuel 
cycle aspects defined in the Protocol. Additionally, 
the United Nations Security Council Resolution 
1540 (April 2004) requires every state to ensure 
that export controls, border controls, material ac-
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countancy and physical protection are efficiently 
addressed, and calls all states to develop appropri-
ate ways to work with and inform industry and 
the public regarding their obligations. The control 
of nuclear expert organisations to ensure the non-
proliferation and peaceful use of sensitive technol-
ogy and dual-use items is a growing global chal-
lenge for all stakeholders.
Nuclear safeguards are commonly seen as the 
traditional nuclear material accountancy and re-
porting system, the main stakeholders of which are 
the international, regional and local authorities 
and the operators. In accordance with the extended 
non-proliferation regime and the amendments to 
the Finnish legislation, the stakeholders, universi-
ties, research organisations or companies that have 
activities defined in the Additional Protocol are 
under reporting requirements and export control. 
These stakeholders as users of nuclear energy are 
required to prepare the nuclear safeguards manual 
and to nominate responsible persons for nuclear 
safeguards arrangements.
1.3 IAEA and Euratom 
safeguards in Finland
The IAEA and the European Commission 
(Euratom safeguards) both have independent man-
dates to operate in Finland. These two internation-
al inspectorates have agreed on cooperation, which 
aims to reduce undue duplication of effort. The 
operators report to the Commission as required by 
Commission Safeguards regulation No 302/2005. It 
is the Commission’s task to audit the licence hold-
ers’ accounting and reporting systems. 
The IAEA integrated safeguards include tra-
ditional nuclear safeguards as per INFCIRC/193, 
and safeguards activities in accordance with the 
Additional Protocol, fitted together. While this 
should not lead to an increase in inspections, it 
should enable the IAEA to assure itself of the ab-
sence of undeclared nuclear activities in a state. 
In practice, the number of IAEA routine interim 
inspections decreases. In contrast to this, the IAEA 
additionally performs 1–3 unannounced or short-
notice inspections per year in a state that has a 
number and type of nuclear installations similar 
to the situation in Finland. The IAEA has annually 
drawn conclusions confirming its confidence that 
all nuclear activities and materials are accounted 
for and are in peaceful use in Finland.
The number of IAEA and Euratom routine 
inspections decreased significantly in 2009, as 
defined in the state-level safeguards approach 
for Finland, which was negotiated during 2007 
and 2008. The time difference between the unan-
nounced inspections at the two spent fuel stor-
ages (i.e. 2 hours for Loviisa and 48 hours for 
Olkiluoto) was decided on due to the difference in 
the surveillance at the storages and reasonable 
access time for a STUK inspector. At the trilat-
eral meeting (IAEA/EC/STUK) in September 2013, 
it was agreed that no unannounced inspections 
with two hours’ notice time would be performed 
in Finland after the beginning of 2014. Thus, all 
short notice inspections are expected to take place 
with 48 hours’ advance notice. STUK continues 
with annual routines consisting of approximately 
40 field inspections, which enables the reduc-
tion in the effort of the international inspector-
ates. At the trilateral meeting (IAEA/EC/STUK) 
in September 2014, STUK requested the IAEA to 
finalise the Subsidiary Arrangements and Facility 
Attachments of the Safeguards Agreement. This 
is considered to be urgent for the specification of 
inspections procedures.
IAEA regular inspections:
Facilities at nuclear power plants (NPP):
•	 Physical	Inventory	Verification	(PIV)	/	Design	
Information	Verification	(DIV)	1/year
•	 Random	Interim	Inspection	(RII)	at	24	h	 
notification	(at	least	1/year)
Spent fuel storages at NPPs
•	 PIV/DIV	1/year
•	 RII	at	48h	notification	(at	least	1/year)
Research reactor and locations outside facilities 
(LOF)
•	 PIV/DIV	1/4–6	years
New reactors, under construction
•	 DIV	and	PIV	later	like	at	the	NPPs
Repository (Onkalo), under construction
•	 PIV/DIV	most	likely	as	at	spent	fuel	storages 
Complementary	accesses	at	2/24	h	notification	to	
verify declared activities or to detect undeclared 
activities.
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According to the Finnish Nuclear Energy 
Act, STUK must be present when the IAEA and 
Euratom are having inspections in Finnish fa-
cilities. Thus STUK has increased preparedness 
for short-notice and unannounced inspections and 
complementary access (abbreviated SNUICA). 
Every weekday, one of STUK’s inspectors is pre-
pared to attend a possible IAEA inspection. 
1.4 Verified declarations for 
state evaluations
A state’s declarations on its nuclear materials and 
activities are the basis for the state evaluation by 
the IAEA under the obligations of the Additional 
Protocol. In Finland, the state has delegated its re-
sponsibility for these declarations to STUK. STUK 
has been nominated a site representative, as per 
European Commission regulation No 302/2005. 
STUK collects, inspects and reviews the relevant 
information and then submits the compiled decla-
rations in timely fashion to the Commission and 
the IAEA.
In Finland, there are currently six sites in the 
sense of the Additional Protocol: the two nuclear 
power plant (NPP) sites in Loviisa and Olkiluoto 
respectively, the geological repository site in 
Olkiluoto, and three minor sites: the Technical 
Research Centre of Finland (VTT), the Radiation 
and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) and the 
Laboratory of Radiochemistry at the University of 
Helsinki (HYRL). STUK reviews and verifies the 
correctness and completeness of the information 
about the sites provided by the stakeholders.
STUK annually reviews the information about 
research and development activities that might be 
eligible for declaration, as well as activities speci-
fied in Annex I of the Additional Protocol. STUK 
maintains the information on general plans related 
to the nuclear fuel cycle for the next 10 years, and 
keeps an account of the exports of specified equip-
ment and non-nuclear materials, as listed in Annex 
II of the Additional Protocol.
Technical analysis methods are one tool for a 
state nuclear safeguards system to ensure that 
nuclear materials and activities within the state 
are in accordance with the licence holders’ declara-
tions, and that there are no undeclared activities. 
Such methods can provide information on the 
identity of the nuclear materials and confirm that 
licence holders’ declarations are correct and com-
plete with respect to, for example, the enrichment 
of uranium as well as the burn-up and cooling time 
of nuclear fuel. The technical analysis methods in 
use are non-destructive assay (NDA), environmen-
tal sampling and satellite imagery.
STUK employs three NDA methods to verify 
spent nuclear fuel. One method lends itself to rapid 
scanning, as the detector is mounted on the fuel 
transfer machine and the fuel elements can be 
measured from above the fuel pond without mov-
ing the elements. On the other hand, the other two 
methods allow confirming the correctness of the 
declared burn-up and the cooling time with greater 
confidence. With the most precise method, the ab-
sence of a fuel pin or pins from a fuel element can 
be discovered. STUK reports to the Commission 
and the IAEA about the NDA measurement cam-
paigns.
All nuclear materials leave traces of their iden-
tity, source of origin and treatment. Safeguards en-
vironmental samples (ES) are used to investigate 
these traces, which provide further information for 
establishing whether the nuclear activities are in 
accordance with the declarations. In the Finnish 
nuclear safeguards system, environmental samples 
are collected as surface swipes. The IAEA may col-
lect independent environmental samples during its 
complementary access type of inspections.
Satellite imagery is applied to verify the site 
declaration in accordance with the Additional 
Protocol. Timely imagery is used to monitor dif-
ferent kinds of activities at the sites or elsewhere 
in Finland. STUK contributes to the work of the 
satellite image analysts of the IAEA and the 
Commission.
1.5 Licensing and export/import 
control of dual-use goods
As per the Finnish Nuclear Energy Act, other nu-
clear fuel cycle-related activities in addition to 
nuclear materials are under regulatory control. 
A licence is required for the possession, transfer 
and import of non-nuclear materials, components, 
equipment and technology suitable for producing 
nuclear energy (nuclear dual-use items). The list of 
these other items is based on the Nuclear Suppliers’ 
Group (NSG) Guidelines (INFCIRC/254 Part 1). 
The licensing authority is STUK. The Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs is responsible for granting NSG 
Government-to-Government Assurances (GTGA) 
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when necessary. The ministry usually consults with 
STUK before giving the assurances. The licence 
holder is required to provide STUK with a list of 
the above-mentioned items annually. Moreover, the 
export, import and transfer of such items must be 
confirmed to STUK after the action.
Mining and mineral processing operations aim-
ing to produce uranium or thorium are also under 
nuclear safeguards and regulatory nuclear safety 
control. In order to carry out these activities, a 
national licence and an accounting system to keep 
track of the amounts of uranium and thorium are 
required. A national licence is also required to ex-
port and import uranium or thorium ore and ore 
concentrates. These activities are also controlled 
by the Euratom Supply Agency and the European 
Commission. Mining and milling activities as well 
as the production of uranium and thorium must be 
reported to STUK, the Commission and the IAEA. 
Finland’s export control system is based on EU 
Council Regulation (EC) No 428/2009 of 5 May 
2009, which sets up a Community regime for the 
control of exports, transfer, brokering and transit 
of dual-use items. This regulation was amended 
in 2014. The export of Nuclear Suppliers’ Group 
(NSG) Part 1 and Part 2 items is regulated by the 
Finnish Act on the Control of Exports of Dual-
use Goods. An authorisation is required to export 
dual-use items outside the European Union as 
well as for EU internal transfers of NSG Part 1 
items, excluding non-sensitive nuclear materials. 
The licensing authority is the Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs. Before granting an export license, it takes 
also care of NSG Government-to-Government 
Assurances. The ministry asks STUK’s opinion on 
all applications concerning NSG Part 1 items.
1.6 The regulatory control of transport 
covers nuclear materials
The requirements for the transport of radioactive 
material are set in the Finnish regulations on the 
transport of dangerous goods. The requirements are 
based on the IAEA safety standard Regulations for 
the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material, SSR-6, 
and their purpose is to protect people, the environ-
ment and property from the harmful effects of ra-
diation during the transport of radioactive material. 
Based on these regulations, STUK is the competent 
national authority for the regulatory control regard-
ing the transport of radioactive material.
In addition to the dangerous goods transport 
regulations, the Finnish Nuclear Energy Act sets 
specific requirements for the transport of nuclear 
material and nuclear waste: generally a licence 
granted by STUK is needed for such a transport. 
Usually the transport licences are granted for a 
fixed period, typically for a few years. A transport 
plan and a transport security plan approved by 
STUK are mandatory for each transport of nuclear 
material or nuclear waste. A certificate of nuclear 
liability insurance must also be delivered to STUK 
before transportation. Furthermore, a package 
may be used for the transport of fissile nuclear 
material only after the package design has been 
approved by STUK.
1.7 STUK’s contribution to international 
safeguards development
Nuclear non-proliferation is, by its nature, an in-
ternational domain. STUK therefore actively 
participates in international nuclear safeguards-
related cooperation and development efforts. The 
practices obtained at the current construction pro-
jects in Olkiluoto have emphasised the need to 
bring in the safeguards requirements at an early 
stage of facility design. In order to improve and 
facilitate the future implementation of safeguards 
at new facilities, STUK initiated negotiations with 
all stakeholders to have the 3-S (safety, security, 
safeguards) concept included in the design require-
ments of new facilities. The experience has been 
shared with the IAEA, several international fora 
and also in bilateral cooperation with several coun-
tries.
STUK is a member of the European Safeguards 
Research and Development Association (ESARDA), 
and has nominated Finnish experts to its commit-
tees and most of the working groups. STUK partic-
ipates in the ESARDA Executive Board meetings 
and in several working groups.
Upon request by the IAEA, STUK’s experts 
have contributed to the IAEA’s international mis-
sions. The current experience obtained from the 
planning, design and construction of new nuclear 
facilities in Finland has increased the number of 
requests to participate in different kinds of inter-
national cooperation. 
STUK keeps close contacts with the respective 
Nordic authority organisations. The development 
of the final disposal of spent nuclear fuel in geo-
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logical repositories is strengthening cooperation 
between Finland and Sweden.
The Finnish Safeguards Support Programme 
to the IAEA Safeguards, FINSP, was established 
in 1988. The aim of FINSP is to provide the IAEA 
with educational and technical support in the field 
of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. FINSP is 
funded by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and im-
plemented by STUK.
In 2014 the partnership programme between 
King Abdullah City for Atomic and Renewable 
Energy (K.A.CARE), Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 
and STUK was launched. The initiative is to give 
expert support to the atomic energy programme 
in Saudi Arabia. In the field of safeguards and 
nuclear security, STUK’s safeguards and security 
experts have started practical cooperation with 
their colleagues at K.A.CARE.
1.8 The Comprehensive Nuclear-
Test-Ban Treaty
The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 
(CTBT) is an important part of the international 
regime for the non-proliferation of nuclear weap-
ons. The CTBT bans any nuclear test explosions in 
any environment. This ban is aimed at constrain-
ing the development and the qualitative improve-
ment of nuclear weapons, including the develop-
ment of advanced new types of nuclear weapons.
The CTBT was adopted by the United Nations 
General Assembly, and was opened for signature 
in New York on 24 September 1996. It will en-
ter into force after it has been ratified by the 44 
states listed in its Annex 2. These 44 states par-
ticipated in the 1996 session of the Conference 
on Disarmament and possess nuclear power or 
research reactors. 
A global verification regime is being established 
in order to monitor compliance with the CTBT. 
The verification regime consists of the following 
elements: the International Monitoring System 
(IMS), a consultation and clarification process, on-
site inspections and confidence-building measures. 
The IMS is almost 90% ready, and is providing 
data from almost 300 measuring stations all over 
the world to more than 1,200 organisations in more 
than 120 countries. In addition to monitoring com-
pliance with the treaty, the data from IMS is used 
in disaster mitigation. CTBTO is actively provid-
ing data to the global Tsunami Warning System 
and, since 2012, the CTBTO has been a member of 
the Inter-Agency Committee on Radiological and 
Nuclear Emergencies (IACRNE) and a co-sponsor 
of the Joint Radiation Emergency Management 
Plan of the International Organisations (JPLAN) 
led by the IAEA. Within this framework, the 
CTBTO is responsible for gathering and providing 
close to real-time radionuclide monitoring data to 
the IAEA and other participating organisations. 
Finland signed the CTBT on its day of opening 
in 1996 and ratified it less than three years later. 
In addition to complying with the basic require-
ment of the CTBT of not carrying out any nuclear 
weapons tests, Finland actively takes part in the 
development of the verification regime.
In the CTBT framework, the Finnish national 
authority is the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. STUK 
has two roles: it operates the Finnish National 
Data Centre (FiNDC) and one of the 16 radionu-
clide laboratories in the IMS (RL07). The most 
Figure 4. The Finnish CTBT organisation.
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important task of FiNDC is to inspect data re-
ceived from IMS and inform the national authority 
about any indications of a nuclear test explosion. 
The radionuclide laboratory contributes to IMS by 
providing support in the radionuclide analyses and 
in the quality control of the radionuclide station 
network. The third major national collaborator is 
the Institute of Seismology at the University of 
Helsinki, which runs an IMS seismology station 
(PS17 in Lahti) and provides analysis of waveform 
IMS data (Figure 4).
1.9 Interfaces between nuclear 
safeguards and security 
STUK is the national authority for the regulatory 
control of nuclear and radiological safety, security 
and safeguards (3 S). All these three regimes have 
a common goal: the protection of people, society, 
the environment and future generations from the 
harmful effects of ionising radiation. As nuclear 
security aims to protect nuclear facilities, nuclear 
material and other radioactive material from un-
lawful activities, it is clear that the majority of the 
activities that aim at non-proliferation of nuclear 
weapons, nuclear materials and sensitive nuclear 
technology contribute to nuclear security. Physical 
and information security measures at nuclear fa-
cilities and for nuclear materials including technol-
ogy, sensitive information and knowledge also con-
tribute to non-proliferation by providing detection 
and delay of and response to security events. On 
the other hand, nuclear material accountancy and 
control measures may supplement security meas-
ures through a deterrence effect. 
The Finnish regulatory system for nuclear se-
curity was audited by an IPPAS mission in 2009, 
followed by an IPPAS follow-up mission in 2012. 
One of the recommendations arising from the audit 
– namely, the need for more detailed security re-
quirements for minor holders of nuclear materials 
– was part of the Nuclear Materials Section’s area 
of responsibility. As a result, the new Guide YVL 
D.1 on regulatory control of nuclear safeguards 
contains more detailed security requirements for 
these minor holders. Guide YVL D.1 complements 
Guides YVL A.11 “Security of a Nuclear Facility” 
and YVL A.12 ”Information Security Management 
of a Nuclear Facility”. STUK safeguards and secu-
rity sections are working in close cooperation to set 
detailed requirements for all the users of nuclear 
energy and to verify that requirements are com-
plied. This ensures that both safeguards and secu-
rity in all use of nuclear energy are taken care of 
as well as possible and national and international 
requirements can be fulfilled.  In 2014, STUK cre-
ated a new assessment type for 3S approach, called 
site walk, where inspectors for safety, security and 
safeguards jointly review licence holder’s processes 
and practices.
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 
(CTBT) Status (31 December 2014)
•	 CTBT	Member	States	 183
•	 Total	Ratifications	 163
•	 Annex	2	Ratifications	 36
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2 Themes 2014
2.1 New STUK Guide YVL D.1
As part of the extensive reformation work on the 
YVL guides, the safeguards requirements in for-
mer YVL 6.9 and YVL 6.10 have been compiled 
while also taking into account changes in safe-
guards since the late 1990s. New areas covered 
include the obligations and measures stemming 
from the Additional Protocol for the Safeguards 
Agreement and recent developments in the area 
of nuclear safeguards. The need for the revision of 
STUK regulations was recognised when applying 
the existing regulations to the construction of the 
new reactor, Olkiluoto 3. During the reformation 
work, the international reviews and stress tests 
performed after the Fukushima accidents were 
also taken into account. The nuclear safeguards 
requirements were addressed, mainly stemming 
from the Olkiluoto 3 experiences by fitting the safe-
guards, security and safety interfaces of a new nu-
clear facility into the bidding phase. The early in-
teraction (often referred as safeguards-by-design) 
between the various disciplines (often referred to 
as the 3-S concept) was included in the high-level 
Guide YVL A.1 “Regulatory Oversight of Safety in 
the Use of Nuclear Energy”.  The Guide YVL D.1 
“Regulatory Control of Nuclear Safeguards” covers 
obligations and requirements to all users of nucle-
ar energy in all phases of the nuclear fuel cycle. All 
stakeholders will have to describe their own safe-
guards system in written form (as a nuclear mate-
rials handbook or safeguards manual) to ease their 
task of fulfilling their obligations and to guarantee 
the effective and comprehensive function of the na-
tional safeguards system. In the new guide, there 
are also specific national requirements for the final 
disposal of spent nuclear fuel. The Guide YVL D.1 
on nuclear safeguards was issued together with 
the other STUK regulations on 15 November and 
entered into force on 1 December 2013. The op-
erators were requested to review their safeguards 
procedures during 2014. STUK also informed all 
nuclear material holders and other stakeholders 
about their duties in accordance with new YVL D.1 
requirements.
The main safeguards requirement is to describe 
operator’s nuclear material accountancy and con-
trol system in nuclear materials manual and also 
describe necessary security measures (including 
information security) in a separate document (se-
curity plan) annexed to the safeguards manual. 
This nuclear material manual and security plan 
shall be submitted to STUK for approval.  This 
requirement was also adapted to those users of 
nuclear energy who are performing research and 
development activities referred in the Additional 
Protocol. STUK is currently assessing these safe-
guards manuals and security plans and some of 
these manuals are already approved by STUK. The 
aim is that all users of nuclear energy are acting in 
accordance with an approved manual by the end of 
the year 2015.    
2.2 Licensing of the final 
disposal facility
At the end of 2012, Posiva submitted an appli-
cation to the Ministry of Employment and the 
Economy for a licence to construct a final disposal 
facility for high level nuclear waste in Olkiluoto. 
The facility will consist of an encapsulation plant 
for spent nuclear fuel above ground and a geologi-
cal repository buried about 400 metres deep in the 
bedrock. In addition to the licence application doc-
uments, Posiva submitted to STUK the material 
identified in the Section 35 of the Nuclear Energy 
Degree. This included “A plan for arranging the 
safeguards control that is necessary to prevent the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons” as stated in the 
Degree. During early 2013, STUK made a prelimi-
nary check of the documents submitted by Posiva 
(docketing), and started requiring additional in-
STUK-B 186
23
formation where needed. The process of inspecting 
the application documents has been an ongoing 
project at STUK since mid-2013, which is foreseen 
to end in early 2015.
In the area of nuclear safeguards, necessary 
safeguards requirements also needed to be de-
veloped and amended, as the facility is the first 
of its kind to be built. In accordance with the 
principles of Safeguards by Design, STUK has 
been working closely together with Posiva, the 
European Commission and the IAEA to develop 
such requirements. Several technical meetings 
were held, in Luxembourg, Vienna, and as video-
conferences.  Based on this work, the IAEA and the 
Commission were, in 2014, able to create a common 
requirement document “Equipment Infrastructure 
Requirements Specification for the Encapsulation 
Plant Operator in Finland”. This work was also 
presented at the IAEA 2014 safeguards symposi-
um by all parties involved. The work on developing 
a similar plan for the geological repository is still 
ongoing. 
STUK has been monitoring the construction 
of the underground rock characterisation facility, 
called Onkalo, from the very beginning, since the 
plan is to include this non-nuclear part into the fu-
ture geological repository. During this construction 
work, Posiva has also been active in developing 
nuclear safeguards for this kind of facility; e.g., the 
safeguards manual has been continuously updated 
and submitted to STUK for approval. Posiva sub-
mitted separate Basic Technical Characteristics 
for the Encapsulation Plant and the Geological 
Repository to the Commission in 2013, and updated 
them in 2014. The IAEA and the Commission have 
made satisfactory yearly safeguards inspections at 
the site, since 2010. When evaluating Posiva’s safe-
guards plan together with the information generat-
ed through the processes mentioned above, STUK 
could reach a positive conclusion. STUK submitted 
its acceptance of Posiva’s above-mentioned plan to 
Posiva in December 2014, including demands that 
Posiva takes the requirement document by the 
IAEA and the Commission into account in its fur-
ther planning and implementation of the encapsu-
lation plant and that Posiva takes future require-
ments by the IAEA, the Commission and STUK 
into account in their further planning and imple-
mentation of the underground repository.  STUK’s 
acceptance of Posiva’s plan will become part of the 
review of Posiva’s application for a construction 
licence that STUK is submitting to the Ministry of 
Employment and the Economy in early 2015.
2.3 Introduction of remote 
data transmission
Remote Data Transmission (RDT) means unat-
tended transmission of information generated by 
IAEA containment and/or surveillance or measure-
ment devices from the facilities to the IAEA head-
quarters. The basic principle of the RDT link is the 
creation of a Virtual Private Network (VPN) tunnel 
between the fully isolated existing data acquisition 
system (i.e. optical surveillance system) inside the 
Loviisa and Olkiluoto nuclear power plants and 
the isolated collecting server at the Commission 
office in Luxembourg. The data is simultaneously 
forwarded to a storage server and to the IAEA 
headquarters in Vienna using a second VPN tun-
nel. In the secured review room at the Luxembourg 
office, dedicated systems can connect to review the 
acquired inspection data on the Storage Server.
 The IAEA right to use the attended and unat-
tended transmission of information is based on the 
Additional Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement. 
This also stipulates the IAEA right to make use of 
internationally established systems of direct com-
munication. Details of the implementation shall be 
specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements and at 
facility level in the Facility Attachments. 
STUK was informed about IAEA’s interest in hav-
ing RDT in use in Finland in October 2010 during 
IAEA director Muroya’s visit Finland. The first of-
ficial meeting with all the counterparts (the IAEA, 
European Commission, STUK and facilities) was 
held in Helsinki in May 2011. After this meet-
ing, official letters to implement RDT in Finnish 
facilities were received from the IAEA and the 
Commission. It was soon noticed that implemen-
tation of RDT is not only a matter of safeguards, 
but also that security measures must be handled 
in the proper manner. Therefore, STUK submit-
ted a letter to the IAEA and EC in January 2013 
in order to take into account the national 3S ap-
proach and requirements set for the facilities while 
implementing RDT. Consequently, the IAEA-EC-
STUK-facilities meeting, in which facilities secu-
rity persons were also requested to participate and 
present their concerns, was held in June 2013. In 
close collaboration a security plan for RDT was 
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created. In February 2014, director Muroya urged 
the implementation of the practical steps dur-
ing an IAEA-STUK technical meeting in Vienna. 
Thereafter, the new generation cameras needed for 
remote data transfer were installed at the Loviisa 
power plant just before the pre-PIT inspections 
in July 2014.  The old telephone cables that were 
suitable for the data transfer were connected to the 
system during the outage, and the RDT started at 
the Loviisa NPP in September with the transfer of 
data since July.  The installation of the equipment 
and cabling at the Olkiluoto NPP is still under 
negotiation. 
2.4 Partnership between 
K.A.CARE and STUK
King Abdullah City for Atomic and Renewable 
Energy (K.A.CARE) and Radiation and STUK 
agreed to form a strategic partnership in 2014. 
Under the agreement, STUK is a strategic partner 
to the K.A.CARE to develop the necessary infra-
structure for the establishment of a national au-
Figure 5. STUK visit to K.A. CARE.
thority dedicated to regulate and monitor nuclear 
safety in Saudi Arabia.
The initiative is considered to be the first of its 
kind, aiming to achieving the K.A.CARE’s objec-
tives of developing a peaceful and safe nuclear en-
ergy programme that would provide Saudi Arabia 
with an alternative and highly sustainable source 
of electric power. Through this partnership that 
will be extended over several years, STUK will pro-
vide the technical support and knowledge required 
to regulate the atomic energy in the Kingdom and 
will assist the development and selections of re-
sources required and develop the necessary train-
ing programmes required to establish a national 
nuclear regulator.
STUK and K.A.CARE experts met first time on 
8–11 September 2014 in Riyadh to chart the situa-
tion and to launch the practical technical coopera-
tion in the field of safeguards and nuclear security. 
The K.A.CARE organised the IAEA Workshop on 
Safeguards Implementation on 2–4 December in 
Riyadh, where the STUK experts took part too. On 
15–19 December, STUK organised, for the experts 
of K.A.CARE, “the SSAC Workshop” in Finland. 
The cooperation has been good and fruitful and will 
continue with many training, guideline, inspection 
practices workshops over the next few years.
Figure 6. Familiarisation with the SSAC.
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3 Safeguards activities in 2014
3.1 The regulatory control of 
nuclear materials
STUK continued with national safeguards meas-
ures as in the past. Nuclear material inventories 
at the end of 2014 are shown in Tables A1 and A2 
in Appendix 1. The development of inspections and 
inspection person days per Material Balance Area 
(MBA) is presented in Figures 7 and 8. Inspections 
by STUK, the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) and the European Commission in 2014 are 
presented in Appendix 2.
The application of integrated safeguards began 
in Finland on 15 October 2008. Thus, in 2009 the 
number of IAEA inspections was reduced from 
approximately 30 person days to 15. Similarly, 
the Commission reduced its inspection activities 
significantly. In 2010, the number of inspection 
days rose somewhat, due to the first inspections at 
the geological repository site, additional inspection 
days at the Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant (NPP), 
and the increased number of random inspections 
in Finland. Since 2010, the number of regular in-
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spections has remained at the same level, i.e. the 
current number of annual IAEA inspection days 
is about 25 person days in Finland. In 2014, the 
IAEA and the Commission carried out an exten-
sive inspection in the planned geological reposi-
tory. During the one-week long survey campaign in 
Onkalo, 65 person days ware spent by the inspec-
tors, technicians and supporting JRC staff. Only 
the inspector days are estimated in the figures.
3.1.1 Declarations and approvals of 
new international inspectors
All the relevant licence holders sent their updated 
information for the national declaration, which is 
compiled by STUK, in time by 1 April. STUK sub-
mitted Finland’s annual declaration updates to the 
IAEA on 15 May 2014 as required. Additionally, 
STUK submitted the quarterly declarations on ex-
ports in February, May, August and November.
In 2014, altogether 21 IAEA and 10 Commission 
inspectors, newly appointed, were approved to per-
form inspections at nuclear facilities in Finland.
3.1.2 The Loviisa nuclear power plant site
In total, STUK performed 14 safeguards inspec-
tions at the Loviisa NPP in 2104. The routine re-
fuelling outage of the Loviisa 1 reactor unit took 
place during the period 20 July – 10 August 2014 
as well as the outage of the Loviisa 2 reactor unit 
during the period 16 August – 20 September 2014. 
STUK, the IAEA and the Commission performed 
a Physical Inventory Taking (pre-PIT) inspection 
before the outage, on 15 – 17 July 2014. Temporary 
surveillance cameras were installed in the reactor 
halls for the outage period, and removed during 
the Physical Inventory Verification (PIV) carried 
out after the outage, on 1 – 2 October 2014. During 
the outage and before the closing of each reactor, 
the IAEA, Commission and STUK verified partial-
ly filled transfer casks whenever a transfer to/from 
a reactor took place, while the reactor lid was open. 
In 2014 three such inspections took place, on the 
21 and 22 August and on 3 September. STUK iden-
tified the fuel assemblies in the reactor cores and 
item-counted the fuel assemblies in the loading 
ponds. The Loviisa 1 core was inspected on 27 July 
2014 and the Loviisa 2 core on 6 September 2014. 
In addition to the PIV and the core controls, STUK 
carried out one routine inspection on its own and 
two together with the IAEA and the Commission. 
One three-day inspection was performed by the 
IAEA, Commission and STUK to install equipment 
for remote data transmission (RDT), Figure 9. 
On the basis of its own assessment as well as 
Figure 9. Installation of surveillance equipment for remote data transmission at the Loviisa NPP.
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that of the IAEA and Commission inspection re-
sults, STUK concluded that Fortum’s Loviisa NPP 
complied with its nuclear safeguards obligations 
in 2014.
3.1.3 The Olkiluoto nuclear power plant site
In 2014, STUK granted to TVO three import li-
cences for importing fresh nuclear fuel. 
The refuelling and maintenance outage of the 
Olkiluoto 1 reactor unit took place during the pe-
riod 11–29 May 2014, and that of the Olkiluoto 2 
reactor unit during the period 1–9 June 2014. The 
PIV was carried out after the outage on 12 June 
2014 in the two reactor units. The spent fuel stor-
age PIV was carried out separately on 25–26 June.
During the refuelling and maintenance outage, 
STUK identified the fuel assemblies in the reactor 
cores and verified as well as item-counted in the 
loading ponds before the reactors were closed. The 
Olkiluoto 1 reactor was inspected on 26 May 2014 
and the Olkiluoto 2 reactor on 7 June 2014.
STUK carried out two additional routine in-
spections at the Olkiluoto site and the material 
balance areas (MBA) at the Olkiluoto NPP. During 
the year, the spent fuel storage enlargement pro-
ject reached the final stages, and the first ones of 
the ponds were covered with the massive shielding 
plates that will prevent regular verification activi-
ties in the future.
The annual design information verification in-
spection in the Olkiluoto 3 unit was carried out on 
5 November 2014. The MBA code W0L4 was as-
signed to Olkiluoto 4 unit already in 2013.  During 
2014 there was no progress with regard to safe-
guards at the new unit. TVO applied for an exten-
sion for Decision-in-Principle granted for 5 years 
in 2010. STUK evaluated the application and did 
not oppose the extension, but the application was 
denied by the Government. Thus, the timeline to 
submit the nuclear construction licence application 
for unit 4 remains summer 2015.
In 2014, STUK approved one person as the 
safeguards responsible person, and one person as 
a deputy for the safeguards responsible person for 
the Olkiluoto power plant. 
On the basis of its own assessment as well 
as the IAEA and Commission inspection results, 
STUK concluded that TVO’s Olkiluoto NPP com-
plied with its nuclear safeguards obligations in 
2014.
3.1.4 The Hanhikivi nuclear 
power plant project
The Government approved a Decisions-in-Principle 
in 2010 for the new operator Fennovoima to con-
struct a new nuclear power plant at a new site. 
STUK initiated negotiations with the operators 
and the Commission as well as with the IAEA in 
2011 to prepare for the implementation of safe-
guards in good time, simultaneously with the facil-
ity development. As a consequence, the company 
could request the vendor organisations to facili-
tate safeguards implementation; for example, to 
improve proliferation resistance and facilitate nu-
clear material verification and surveillance at the 
future plant. In the meantime, Fennovoima created 
an organisation for safeguards and prepared for 
the implementation of safeguards. 
One of the first steps in the construction process 
is the control of nuclear technology, such as sensi-
tive information obtained from the bidding compa-
nies. During 2014, STUK granted to Fennovoima 
four licences for the import and possession of 
nuclear technology (nuclear information), and two 
of them also included transfer of the technol-
ogy to the subcontractors.  It was obvious that 
the first version of the nuclear materials hand-
book should focus on the current needs to control 
the nuclear technology and dual-use equipment. 
Thus, Fennovoima submitted its safeguards man-
ual “Fennovoima Managements System: Nuclear 
Materials Manual” to STUK for approval in May 
2014. STUK approved the manual on 4 July 2014.
As the option of having Rosatom as a vendor 
candidate was not included in the application 
ratified in 2010, the re-assessment of the already 
approved application began in 2013 for technical 
and organisational changes since the Decision-
in-Principle. STUK gave its updated preliminary 
safety evaluation to the Ministry Employment 
and the Economy on 23 May 2014. STUK stated 
that the proposed AES-2006 plant can be con-
structed to fulfil the Finnish safety requirements 
at the Hanhikivi location specified by Fennovoima. 
However, in STUK’s opinion, Fennovoima must 
strengthen its expertise and develop its manage-
ment system in general. From the safeguards point 
of view, the safeguards procedures have improved 
and important experience has been gained by the 
new stakeholder during the bidding phase. On 
5 December 2014, the Parliament endorsed the 
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Decision-in-Principle of 2010 for the new reactor 
type with a requirement for reasonable domestic 
ownership. Owing to this, the nuclear construc-
tion licence application is expected to be submitted 
in 2015 in accordance with the 5-year timeline of 
2010.
Based on the meetings on the implementation 
of safeguards and the control of nuclear technol-
ogy with Fennovoima’s staff, STUK concludes that 
awareness and preparedness for safeguards proce-
dures are at an adequate level in the new organisa-
tion preparing for the new project.
3.1.5 The VTT FiR1 research reactor site
In 2014, the preparations for decommissioning the 
research reactor and those for the new nuclear 
safety centre building continued at the Technical 
Research Centre of Finland, VTT. STUK reviewed 
the decommissioning plans and made its state-
ment about the Environmental Impact Assessment 
to the Ministry of Employment and the Economy. 
In 2014, STUK carried out one interim inspec-
tion at the research reactor site of VTT. In addition, 
the site declaration and, in particular, the progress 
in construction activities, were checked a few 
times during the year. STUK and the Commission 
verified the nuclear material inventory of VTT on 
3 October 2014. The nuclear material inventory 
was concluded to be correct during the inspection. 
However, the internal reporting of small amounts 
and batches was addressed and a few remarks 
were made. Also, the need to update the BTC was 
notified due to new nominations for responsible 
contact persons at VTT.
STUK and VTT responsible persons met twice 
and discussed future actions to ensure appro-
priate safeguards procedures. The update of the 
BTC for the reactor and the preliminary BTC for 
the new building of the VTT Centre for Nuclear 
Safety under construction were submitted to the 
Commission on 31 December 2014. The small 
amounts of nuclear material used in the laborato-
ries located in the reactor building will be moved 
to the new building once it is commissioned. The 
current target is at the beginning of 2016. The aim 
is to have separate MBAs for the two separate VTT 
buildings with different activities. The site delimit-
ed according to the Additional Protocol covers only 
the reactor building.  In addition, VTT prepared a 
separate safeguards manual to cover the respon-
sibilities to report and control the research and 
development activities defined in the Additional 
Protocol. These activities are carried out in several 
buildings in the research campus area in Espoo.
On the basis of its assessment and inspection 
results, STUK concluded that VTT complied with 
its nuclear safeguards obligations in 2014.
3.1.6 STUK site
STUK Nuclear Materials Section verified the phys-
ical inventory, and inspected the site declaration 
and basic technical characteristics during the in-
spection on 10 December 2014.  Also, the draft for 
the new safeguards manual was reviewed. Thus, it 
can be concluded that the operating unit at STUK 
fulfils the requirements for national safeguards ar-
rangements.
3.1.7 University of Helsinki site
STUK carried out its inspection to the University 
of Helsinki site on 5 March 2014 to verify the site 
declaration and the inventory. The University pre-
pared its nuclear material handbook in June 2014. 
The manual covers the control and reporting proce-
dures for nuclear materials and also the action for 
reporting the research and development activities 
as defined in the Additional Protocol were added to 
the handbook. All these activities are carried out in 
the same building.
On the basis of its assessment and inspection 
results, STUK concluded that the University of 
Helsinki complied with its nuclear safeguards obli-
gations in 2014.
3.1.8 Minor nuclear material holders
In 2014, STUK inspected the reports from the mi-
nor nuclear material holders. One minor holder re-
ported termination of possession of nuclear mate-
rial. The licence of the University of Jyväskylä was 
renewed; and, a new licence was granted to Aalto 
University.   The minor holders were requested 
to prepare their nuclear materials handbooks as 
required in the new STUK regulation, the Guide 
YVL D.1. These were prepared during the year, but 
the approval process will continue in 2015.
On the basis of its assessment, STUK concluded 
that the minor nuclear material holders complied 
with their nuclear safeguards obligations in 2014.
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3.1.9 Front-end fuel cycle operators
The operators at Harjavalta and Kokkola report 
monthly to the Commission and STUK. The ex-
traction of uranium from industrial purification 
processes is considered to be a pre-safeguard activ-
ity and therefore not subject to IAEA safeguards. 
With the entry into force of Guide YVL D.1 immi-
nent, the operators are preparing their procedures 
to fulfil the new requirements. In particular, the 
nuclear safeguards manual are to be incorporated 
into the quality managements systems. During the 
year 2014, STUK reviewed the draft versions of the 
manuals prepared by Norilsk Nickel Harjavalta 
and Freeport Kokkola. On the basis of its assess-
ment, STUK concluded that these operators com-
plied with their nuclear safeguards obligations in 
2014.
During early 2011, STUK evaluated the li-
cence application of Talvivaara Sotkamo Ltd to 
begin uranium production as a by-product at 
the Talvivaara nickel mine. On 1 March 2012, 
the Finnish government granted a licence in ac-
cordance with the Finnish nuclear legislation to 
Talvivaara Sotkamo Ltd for the extraction of ura-
nium from the Talvivaara mine. According to the 
licence conditions, STUK must ensure that all rel-
evant arrangements are in place, including the nu-
clear safeguards manual and responsible persons 
for nuclear materials accountancy before the plant 
is commissioned. During 2011–2013, the uranium 
extraction plant was built as a new unit in the 
mineral processing complex. Progress in uranium 
extraction was halted on 5 December 2013 when 
the Supreme Administrative Court revoked the 
licence of 1 March 2012 to extract uranium for re-
assessment by the Finnish government. According 
to the Supreme Administrative Court, there were 
several changes in the operations of Talvivaara 
Sotkamo Ltd following the permit decision, includ-
ing corporate reorganisation. Before the ruling, the 
government must reassess the licence application 
documentation and, if needed, obtain additional 
information on the economic and safety-related 
requirements set forth in the Nuclear Energy Act. 
Moreover, during 2014 the Talvivaara Sotkamo 
Ltd. continued for restructuring and finally filed 
for bankruptcy on 6 November 2014. The parent 
company Talvivaara Mining will provide support 
for the bankruptcy proceedings. There were no 
safeguards activities at Talvivaara in 2014.
3.1.10 The final disposal facility site 
for spent nuclear fuel
After the submission of the nuclear construction 
licence application in 2012, several meetings were 
arranged between STUK, the Commission and the 
IAEA during 2013 and 2014, in order to clarify and 
facilitate safeguards measures for the final dis-
posal of spent nuclear fuel. These meetings focused 
on the verification issues prior to spent fuel encap-
sulation. The requirement document for the IAEA/
EC equipment to be installed in the encapsulation 
plant was prepared and finalised in 2014.
In order to clarify the inspection procedures 
in the future repository, a technical meeting was 
arranged by the IAEA, to take place in Vienna on 
23 September June 2014.  This was followed on 24 
September 2014 with the trilateral meeting where 
it was confirmed that “scanning of the Onkalo tun-
nels using 3D laser will be important, not only for 
Safeguards but for future generations to be pro-
vided with a full and well-defined picture of where 
the nuclear material is located”.
  Before the September meetings at the IAEA 
Posiva submitted an update of the Basic Technical 
Characteristics (BTC) for the geological reposi-
tory on 17 September 2014. However, during 3 – 7 
November 2014, four survey teams consisting of 
the Commission, JRC/Ispra and the IAEA inspec-
tor and technicians independently mapped the un-
derground premises using laser scanning devices 
(Figures 10 and 11), as agreed in the September 
meetings. All teams were escorted by operator’s 
staff. The access tunnel was reserved for the sur-
veyors and, in addition one meeting room was re-
served for the data processing team for the whole 
week. Finally, the underground premises were 
confirmed to correspond to the drawings that were 
available at the construction site, with a minor re-
mark on drawing accuracy. Owing to the security-
relevant nature of the detailed information, all the 
data collected and drawings inspected were left in 
several sealed copies at the site. 
Posiva updated its safeguards manual in spring 
2014 mainly to correspond to organisational chang-
es and current safeguards practices. During 2014, 
STUK approved the manual update and carried 
out two interim inspections at the underground 
premises. These focused on the completeness and 
correctness of the operator’s data, drawings and 
reports. On the basis of its assessment and inspec-
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tion results, STUK concluded that Posiva complied 
with its nuclear safeguards obligations in 2014.
3.1.11 Verification of spent fuel
In January 2014, STUK tested the prototype of a 
Passive Gamma Emission Tomography (PGET) de-
vice with hexagonal fuel at the Loviisa NPP, with 
promising results.  The PGET is designed to be 
able to detect even single-pin diversions from spent 
nuclear fuel. The PGET technology is a strong can-
didate for the NDA verification of spent nuclear 
fuel before the fuel is placed in the final repository. 
There is a special need for good verification at that 
stage, as the fuel becomes impossible to reach for 
Figure 11. Design information verification in Onkalo (photo: JRC).
Figure 10. 3D laser scanner in Onkalo (photo: JRC).
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verification once it has been deposited deep in the 
bedrock. All measured fuel elements were verified 
to hold spent nuclear fuel in a pin configuration 
corresponding to operator data. One of the meas-
ured fuel elements had three pins substituted by 
zirconium pins, and they were correctly detected 
with the measurement. The test at Loviisa showed 
that the device is capable of detecting single pin 
diversion from hexagonal fuel. In addition to STUK 
and TVO staff, technical experts of the device and 
observers from the IAEA and the Commission par-
ticipated in the campaign. The elements measured 
during the campaign were also measured with a 
Fork device, to provide data for comparison.
In November 2014 STUK performed a Gamma 
burn-up verification (GBUV) measurement cam-
paign at the Olkiluoto NPP. During the campaign, 
49 fuel elements were measured and verified as 
spent fuel. One fuel element with a missing pin 
provided a result that differed significantly from 
the expected value, showing the power of this veri-
fication method.
A planned FORK measurement campaign at 
the Loviisa NPP in December was aborted, due to 
technical problems with the fuel transfer machine 
at the storage pond.
3.1.12 Nuclear dual-use items, export licences
In 2014, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs issued 
seven export licences for NSG Part 1 items: two 
individual licences to the Russian Federation and 
one to the UK,  together with four  global licences 
for exporting nuclear technology (nuclear informa-
tion) for a nuclear power plant.
3.1.13 Transport of nuclear materials 
and nuclear waste
In 2014, fresh nuclear fuel was imported to Finland 
from Germany, Sweden and the Russian Federation 
(Table A1, Appendix 1). In relation to these im-
ports, STUK approved three transport plans and 
one transport package design. Furthermore, STUK 
approved one plan and permit for transport with 
specific arrangements in category 7 materials and 
nuclear waste treatment outside Finland. 
STUK inspected fresh nuclear fuel transports 
in accordance with the inspection plan (two inspec-
tions). The inspections were performed in coopera-
tion with the police.
3.1.14 International transfers of 
nuclear material
In 2014, TVO reported to STUK about its interna-
tional fuel contracts, fuel transfers and fuel ship-
ments. Based on the document inspection findings, 
STUK concluded that TVO has complied with its 
safeguards obligations when purchasing the nu-
clear fuel and managing its international nuclear 
material transfers. The other operators purchase 
fuel as an end-product, and thus their accountancy 
does not need to cover the purchase chain abroad.
In 2014, STUK approved one person as a deputy 
for the safeguards responsible person with the re-
sponsibility for the international transfers of TVO’s 
nuclear material. Furthermore, STUK approved 
the safeguards manual concerning TVO’s interna-
tional transfers of nuclear material.
3.1.15 Other stakeholders 
In 2014, STUK granted three licences to expert 
organisations to possess and transfer nuclear 
technology (nuclear information) related to the 
Fennovoima project.
In 2014, research organisations and universi-
ties that perform research and development work 
defined in the Additional Protocol  were requested 
to nominate their responsible persons and prepare 
a safeguards manual. Since the work does not need 
a licence, these contact persons were not officially 
approved by STUK. The approval of the manuals 
will take place in 2015. 
3.2 The Finnish National Data 
Centre for the Comprehensive 
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
3.2.1 International cooperation is the 
foundation of CTBT verification
During 2014, the Finnish National Data Centre 
(FiNDC) participated in meetings of the Working 
Group B (WGB) of the Preparatory Commission 
for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 
Organization (CTBTO). WGB is a policy-making 
organ for the technical development of the veri-
fication regime. By participating in the work of 
WGB and its subsidiaries (workshops and expert 
groups), the FiNDC can provide technical expertise 
to the CTBTO, while also attending to Finnish na-
tional interests.
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3.2.2 The analysis pipeline is a well 
established daily routine
The FiNDC routinely analyses all radionuclide 
measurement data generated at the IMS radionu-
clide stations across the world. The analysis pipe-
line is linked to the LINSSI database and equipped 
with an automated alarm system, to enable ef-
ficient and fully automated screening of the data. 
The IMS network is still developing, and the num-
ber of installed air filter stations was 66 at the end 
of 2014 (in the final stage there will be 80).
The number of IMS stations equipped with ra-
dioxenon measurement capabilities was 30 at the 
end of 2014. 22 IMS radioxenon systems were certi-
fied by the CTBTO at the end of 2014. Radioxenon 
measurements are especially important for CTBT 
verification, because xenon, as a noble gas, may 
also leak from underground tests, which seldom 
release particulate matter. The operational sta-
tions generated more than 1,000 gamma and beta-
gamma spectra per day for the FiNDC analysis 
pipeline to handle. The particulate pipeline is well-
established and has been running stably for many 
years, while FiNDC still needs some refinement of 
its xenon analysis capabilities.
In 2014, there were no indications of nuclear 
testing in the data provided by the CTBTO; neither 
were there any alarms by the Finnish Institute 
of Seismology or any other indications of possible 
nuclear tests that would have required the spe-
cial attention of the FiNDC. Xenon radioisotopes 
released from medical isotope production facili-
ties and NPPs are regularly measured all around 
the globe. Anthropogenic nuclides with CTBT rel-
evance, mainly 99Tc, 131I from medical isotope pro-
duction and 137Cs from Chernobyl and Fukushima 
fallout are regularly measured at some particulate 
stations.
3.3 International cooperation
The implementation of safeguards in Finland was 
addressed at several meetings with the IAEA and 
the Commission. In addition, STUK continued its 
participation in the ESARDA working groups, ex-
ecutive board and the steering committee meet-
ings. The head of STUK’s Security Technology 
Laboratory continued his term as the chairper-
son of the ESARDA Novel Approaches/Novel 
Technologies Working Group. A STUK safeguards 
expert was invited to take over the vice-chair of 
the Verification Technologies and Methodologies 
(VTM) Working Group.  The IAEA organised the 
workshop on synergies between safety, security and 
safeguards especially for the nuclear newcomer 
states, and the STUK expert recounted experiences 
of existing and new Finnish nuclear programmes. 
STUK experts also provided a few presentations 
at the INMM annual meeting, and in particular at 
the IAEA safeguards symposium in October 2014.
 The progress at the Olkiluoto 3 unit, which 
has been under construction since 2003, and the 
more current authorisation of the planning and 
design of new nuclear facilities in 2010 have given 
STUK practical experience in implementing safety, 
security and safeguards for new nuclear facilities. 
Owing to this, STUK experts have been invited on 
several occasions to provide guidance and share 
their experiences. Some of this activity has been 
facilitated via the Finnish Support Programme to 
the IAEA, but there have also been other mecha-
nisms available to contribute to the worldwide 
cooperation. In addition, the new facilities at the 
front- and back-ends of the fuel cycle – i.e. the 
extraction of uranium in mining and milling and 
the development of the geological repository – have 
widened the capabilities and scope of the Finnish 
national safeguards system.
Finland’s bilateral cooperation programmes 
in the area of non-proliferation are directed 
mainly towards its neighbouring countries out-
side the EU and are motivated by the continued 
need to enhance the regional security environ-
ment. Accordingly, STUK continued its cooper-
ation programme with the Russian Federation. 
Collaboration with Ukraine in mutually beneficial 
areas was re-established in 2008, and an agree-
ment about a programme was made between STUK 
and the State Nuclear Regulatory Committee of 
Ukraine (since 2011, the State Nuclear Regulatory 
Inspectorate of Ukraine (SNRIU)). Due to con-
strained human and financial resources, STUK 
was not in a position to manage projects; however, 
STUK continued providing limited expert support 
to capacity building in 2014.
3.3.1 Support programme to the IAEA
The Finnish Support Programme to the IAEA 
Safeguards (FINSP) is financed by the Ministry 
for Foreign Affairs and coordinated by STUK. The 
FINSP was established in May 1998, and celebrat-
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ed its 25th anniversary in February 2014 in Vienna 
with colleagues from the IAEA and other Member 
States Support Programmes. The history of FINSP 
was described at the INMM meeting in 2013. The 
total cumulative budget over these 25 years ap-
proaches €10M. 
Politically, the FINSP can be seen as support to 
the NPT verification regime and as a demonstra-
tion of strong commitment to non-proliferation. 
Signing NPT and the Comprehensive Safeguards 
Agreement means an engagement to an under-
taking to cooperate in order to enable efficient 
implementation of the IAEA safeguards system. 
A State Support Programme is an excellent vol-
untary mechanism to that end. However, from the 
technical point of view, FINSP helps the IAEA to 
develop its safeguards concepts and technologies. 
The most demanding task in recent years has 
been the JNT A 1510 Proto-type Tomographic 
Spent Fuel Detector System. Its goal is to develop 
a passive gamma emission tomographic verifier. In 
2012–2014, three successful campaigns were con-
ducted. The first was held in Ispra in June 2012, 
the second in Olkiluoto in March 2013, and the 
third in Loviisa in January 2014. It is now shown 
that the prototype system is able to generate a 
cross-sectional activity map of a spent fuel item, 
and is able to detect a single missing pin inside a 
VVER-440 fuel assembly. IAEA and FINSP have 
opened another task for implementation support 
of the tomography. The aim is to develop the pro-
totype into a functional and operational inspection 
tool for the IAEA.
Another task worth mentioning is the 
Newcomers Task: the FIN B 1939 Support for 
Newcomers States Pursuing a Nuclear Power 
Programme. Many new states want to join the 
“Nuclear Family” and are planning their nuclear 
power programmes. For the IAEA safeguards, this 
is a challenge and a source of extra workload. 
Under the task B 1939, Finland provides peer sup-
port to the newcomers and tries to provide answers 
to their practical questions. Our experiences are 
relevant, because in Finland there are nuclear 
power reactor construction projects actually going 
on. Regulatory Authority and nuclear operators 
are all involved in the task and in the issues of nu-
clear safety and security in the internal workshops. 
However, “one size does not fit all” and replicating 
Finnish system all round the globe as such is most 
likely not the correct solution. What FINSP can 
do is to show how the operator-authority interface 
works in Finland. FINSP hosted a workshop in 
Helsinki and in Olkiluoto on 1–5 September 2014. 
The contribution of TVO and Posiva is greatly ap-
preciated.
FINSP has also organised NDA training for 
the IAEA inspectors. A Spent Fuel Verification 
Training Course was held at Loviisa NPP on 29–31 
October 2014, with the support and cooperation of 
the NPP operator Fortum.
3.3.2 Final disposal programme 
and the ASTOR group
The programmes for a geological repository for 
spent nuclear fuel in Sweden and Finland have 
reached the licensing phase, and the safeguards 
measures must be agreed to by all parties: facility 
designers, operators and the inspectorates. Thus, 
the IAEA and the Commission presented their 
safeguards approaches at the last Application of 
Safeguards to Geological Repositories (ASTOR) 
group’s meetings. In 2014, the group of experts met 
in Oskarshamn, Sweden on 19 – 21 May.  There 
were almost 50 participants attending the meet-
ing and excursions to the canister laboratory and 
underground spent fuel storage facility, as well as 
the Äspö hard rock laboratory. The next ASTOR 
meeting will be hosted by Korea in 2015.
A new task force consisting of the IAEA, the 
Commission and Finnish and Swedish authorities 
and operators was established at the 2012 ASTOR 
meeting. The first Lower Level Liaison Committee 
(LLLC) Encapsulation Plant and Geological 
Repository (EPGR) Liaison Group meeting was 
scheduled for January 2013 to discuss the draft 
versions for Basic Technical  Characteristics of the 
encapsulation plant and the geological repository. 
The Committee did meet officially during neither 
2013 nor 2014, but IAEA and the Commission rep-
resentatives commented on the preparation of the 
BTC documents during spring 2013 as described in 
Chapter 3.1.10. Within this framework the require-
ment document for the IAEA/EC equipment to be 
installed in the encapsulation plant was prepared 
and included in the licensing conditions, as de-
scribed in Chapter 2.2.
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3.3.3  Cooperation with Rostechnadzor 
and Rosatom, Russia
Cooperation between Finnish and Russian authori-
ties, technical support organisations, industrial 
partners and the status of the cooperation pro-
gramme were reviewed at the regular meeting in 
February 2014. The fully functional spent fuel at-
tribute tester (SFAT) measurement device for the 
Rostechnadzor was delivered from STUK for use by 
the inspectors of the Ural Regional Office at Mayak 
in 2014. To successfully complete the project train-
ing was provided by STUK for Rostechnadzor in-
spectors and operators of the Mayak reprocessing 
plant at STUK and at the Loviisa NPP autumn 
2014. This bilateral work complements the work 
done within the EU financed TACIS project, which 
aims at improving the supervision and control of 
the handling of nuclear materials at the Mayak 
plant.
During 2014, the planning of the seminar aimed 
at enhancing control of radioactively contaminated 
scrap metal consignments continued. The seminar 
on knowledge-sharing on maritime transporta-
tion of nuclear and other radioactive materials in 
the Baltic Sea region was conducted by STUK on 
11 – 12 February 2014, in cooperation with the 
Expert Group on Nuclear and Radiation Safety 
(EGNRS) of the Council of the Baltic Sea States 
and the Baltic Sea Regional Boarder Coordination 
Committee. In 2014, the Russian Federation – i.e. 
the Khlopin Radium Institute of Rosatom – took 
over the chairmanship of the ERGNRS, after the 
previous three-year position enjoyed by STUK.
3.3.4  Capacity building in Ukraine
From 2009 to 2010, the focus of the programme 
with Ukraine was on manufacturing and deliver-
ing a mobile laboratory vehicle for the use of the 
State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate of Ukraine 
(SNRIU). The mobile measuring laboratory called 
Sophisticated ON-site Nuclide Identification 
(SONNI) enables the identification and analysis 
of radioactive sources and nuclear materials in the 
environment, at industrial facilities and in cases of 
threatening situations. At locations where the vehi-
cle cannot have access, a portable application with 
the same functionality can be used. The modern ra-
diation measuring vehicle together with the port-
able application unit was donated to the IAEA and 
further to SNRIU in Kiev in December 2010. Since 
then educational sessions have been organised to 
train the new crews with field exercises. The capac-
ity building in this area is financed by the Ministry 
for Foreign Affairs. As continuation to this train-
ing, a new project was approved by the European 
commission to strengthen SNRIU’s capabilities to 
provide independent radiation monitoring using 
the mobile laboratory. The practical exercises in 
2013 focused on territories with medical institu-
tions that use radiation and nuclear technologies, 
and round uranium mining and milling facilities. 
Special emphasis was given to the use of the mo-
bile laboratory as part of normal regulatory ac-
tivities. These projects were successfully completed 
during in 2014. 
In addition, another EU project was imple-
mented to enhance border control functions by 
providing conventional radiation detectors and 
new technical means for protection against chemi-
cal, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) 
threats. Training was arranged for border control 
officers at the selected border stations between 
Poland and Ukraine in November 2012. This EU-
funded project was completed during 2013 and, as 
a consequence, Ukraine provided several project 
proposals to be coordinated and funded within the 
G8 Global Partnership process. The European com-
mission also indicated its willingness to re-allocate 
funds for Ukraine in future.
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3.4 Radiation monitoring at 
border crossing stations
STUK and Finnish Customs have a joint project 
for the radiation border monitoring of Finnish 
border-crossing stations. The upgrading project, 
RADAR, continues until 2015. In 2014, the pro-
ject maintained the existing systems and planned 
the procurements, which will take place in 2015. 
Border monitoring has several aims: it helps to 
find sources which are beyond regulatory control, 
and it is also part of the detection architecture 
combating the illicit trafficking of radioactive and 
nuclear materials, the proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction, and nuclear terrorism. 
STUK was also involved in the development of 
nuclear detection architecture together with other 
authorities such as the Customs, Police and Border 
Guard, etc. This also has an international dimen-
sion in the Baltic Sea region, as described above 
in subsection 3.3.3. Finnish and Russian Customs 
authorities in cooperation with STUK organised a 
cross-border exercise in September 2014.  
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4 Human resources development
Nuclear materials safeguards implemented by 
the Nuclear Materials Section of STUK cover all 
typical measures of a State System of Accounting 
for and Control of Nuclear Materials (SSAC), and 
many other activities besides. The nuclear fuel cy-
cle-related activities such as research and develop-
ment activities not involving nuclear material or 
the manufacture of certain equipment as defined 
in the Additional Protocol have extended the scope 
of traditional safeguards. Nuclear safeguards on 
the national level are closely linked with the other 
functions of nuclear materials control and non-
proliferation: licensing, export control, border con-
trol, transport control, combating illicit trafficking, 
the physical protection of nuclear materials, and 
monitoring compliance with the Comprehensive 
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). The continuous 
analysis of the developments in the involved fields 
of both technology and politics is a daily, multi-
disciplinary task in the STUK Nuclear Materials 
Section. Most of the experts working in Nuclear 
Materials Sections have also been reserved to work 
for STUK’s Emergency Preparedness as experts 
and in case of emergency. That is a good overall 
view of the whole scale work of STUK, and continu-
ous training keeps experts in touch.
The personnel’s competence is systematically 
developed, taking into account the needs of the 
organisation and the wishes of individuals. Those 
aiming at an expert’s career are valued as highly 
as those interested in managerial duties. One 
of the inspectors attended the Euratom train-
ing course on European Nuclear Safeguards in 
Luxembourg. Nuclear material section has devel-
oped its activities in workshops. In 2014, one work-
shop was held on the subject of a good and effective 
working community.
Because of the restrictions of the State budget 
and its consequences for STUK’s resources, STUK 
undertook a reorganisation in accordance with its 
primary tasks in 2014 and initiated the imple-
mentation of the consequent new organisation. 
Thus, when implementing the new strategy, it is 
important to launch a new kind of cooperation with 
other STUK units to optimise the use of skills and 
resources.
The work of a support group for the Nuclear 
Materials Section continued in 2014.  The group 
provides the head of the Section with information 
and knowledge gathered by the group members 
during the years they have spent working in 
other organisations such as the IAEA.  This ena-
bles discussion of important questions from vari-
ous perspectives. The support group members are 
the directors of the Nuclear Waste and Material 
Regulation and four senior experts from a range 
of STUK organisational units. The group met only 
twice with a specific agenda on implementation of 
the Remote Data Transmission to the Finnish nu-
clear facilities. 
The cooperation with other units is based on ex-
change of information, and consequent motivation 
and training. The Nuclear Materials Section held 
meetings with other STUK units to allocate syner-
gies and activities which may be implemented in 
cooperation. For example, the spent fuel verifica-
tion measurements in the current organisation 
are carried out by the staff of Environmental 
Radiation Surveillance. In this unit, there are ex-
perts on measurements and analysis, and they also 
play an important role in Emergency Preparedness 
because they prepare estimations of how the ra-
dioactivity from a reactor will disperse. It is also 
a challenge for them to familiarise themselves 
with the fuel and nuclear power plants. In addi-
tion, STUK Radiation Practices Regulation carries 
out regular inspections of organisations that use 
radioactive sources and small amounts of nuclear 
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The experts working for nuclear materials control. All staff members participate in the core safeguards tasks. 
Additionally, each person has some special areas of expertise to focus on.
Ms. Elina Martikka Section Head Management
Ms. Ritva Kylmälä Assistant Day-to-day business, archiving
Mr. Timo Ansaranta Inspector Control of operators’ competence at facilities, inspections, declarations
Mr. Marko Hämäläinen Senior Inspector Safeguards regulation, Inspection coordination, Additional Protocol-related 
matters
Mr. Tapani Honkamaa Senior Inspector FINSP to the IAEA safeguards, measurements and verification methods
Mr. Mikael Moring Senior Inspector Finnish National Data Centre for the CTBT, safeguards for final disposal
Mr. Olli Okko Senior Inspector Safeguards for geological repository, Additional Protocol-related oversight 
of R&D activities
Mr. Timo Wiander Senior Inspector Safeguards inspections and information security
 
materials. During such inspections, it is possible to 
perform nuclear safeguards inspection in accord-
ance with the training and check-list previewed 
by the Nuclear Materials Section. Nuclear secu-
rity and safeguards may have varied aspects to 
the control of nuclear materials. Therefore, it is 
necessary to have close cooperation between these 
two units. Cooperation and good communication 
between different departments and units improve 
nuclear safety, security and safeguards in gen-
eral. Information security is a joint concern of both 
units.
The distribution of the working days of the 
Nuclear Materials Section in the different duty ar-
eas is presented in Figure 12. Most of the working 
days are invoiced to the stakeholders. As seen in 
Figure 12, the duty areas are divided into those of 
direct oversight and inspections (basic operations), 
support functions including maintenance, develop-
ment work for the regulatory functions and con-
sultancy, including, e.g. international cooperation 
financed by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs or the 
EU. However, the state budgetary funding consti-
tutes about 6% of the total funding of the Nuclear 
Materials Section.
Distribution of working days
30; 15 %
91; 45 %
Direct oversight and inspections
Budgetary funding
Support functions
Expert services
13; 6 %
68; 34 %
  
Figure 12. The distribution of working days of the Nuclear Materials Section in the various duty areas.
38
STUK-B 186
5 Conclusions
STUK continued with national safeguards meas-
ures and activities with 72 inspection days and 
43 inspections. The implementation of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inte-
grated safeguards began in Finland on 15 October 
2008.  Since 2010, the number of IAEA and 
European Commission inspections annually has 
been close to 20. The implementation of the IAEA 
integrated safeguards reduces the total number 
of annual routine inspections days of the inter-
national inspectorates, but includes short-notice 
random inspections. In order to be present at all of 
the short-notice IAEA inspections, STUK has had 
a daily on-call inspector. 
In 2014, STUK performed 32 safeguards inspec-
tions at the Finnish nuclear power plants (NPP), 
14 at the Loviisa NPP and 18 at the Olkiluoto 
NPP. The Commission and the IAEA took part 
in 16 of these inspections. The number of inspec-
tions at Loviisa was higher than usual, due to the 
installation of new cameras that are suitable for 
remote data transfer. During the outages, the cask 
movements were also verified. At Olkiluoto NPP, 
the extension of the spent fuel storage and the 
installation of the pond covers resulted in some 
additional safeguards activities. STUK performed 
one non-destructive assay measurement campaign 
at the Loviisa NPP to test the passive gamma 
emission tomography prototype; the IAEA and the 
Commission participated in this campaign as ob-
servers. STUK performed one non-destructive as-
say measurement campaign at the Olkiluoto NPP. 
At other facilities, the Commission took part in the 
accountancy inspection and physical inventory ver-
ification at the VTT research reactor, and together 
with the IAEA in the BTC and design information 
verification of the planned geological repository at 
the final disposal site at Olkiluoto. The verification 
was carried out during a one-week long survey 
campaign by a joint team assisted by technicians 
from both inspectorates and the JRC.  The total 
number of safeguards inspections in 2014 was 43 
for STUK, 23 for the Commission, and 20 for the 
IAEA. The IAEA sent its safeguards statements 
to the Commission, which amended them with its 
own conclusions and forwarded them to STUK. The 
conclusions by the Commission were in line with 
the IAEA’s remarks as well as with STUK’s own 
findings; there were no outstanding questions by 
the IAEA or the Commission at the end of 2014.
The results of STUK’s nuclear safeguards in-
spection activities continued to demonstrate that 
the Finnish licence holders take good care of their 
nuclear materials. There were no indications of un-
declared materials or activities, and the inspected 
materials and activities were in accordance with 
the licence holders’ declarations. Neither the IAEA 
nor the Commission made any remarks, nor did 
they present any required actions based on their 
inspections. By means of their nuclear materi-
als accountancy and control systems, all licence 
holders enabled STUK to fulfil its own obliga-
tions under the international agreements relevant 
to nuclear safeguards and non-proliferation. The 
main open concern at the IAEA was about the 
initiation of remote data transfer at the Olkiluoto 
NPP. In contrast to this, STUK pointed out the 
need to have safeguards requirements clarified for 
the geological repository before the licensing of the 
final disposal facility. In general, the subsidiary ar-
rangements and facility attachments should be up-
dated for old facilities, and prepared for new ones.
In 2014, STUK’s Nuclear Materials Section 
cooperated closely with the IAEA in order to share 
experiences and train authorities’ staff in countries 
that are aiming at nuclear programmes, i.e. urani-
um production or nuclear energy. STUK cooperated 
with Finnish Customs to offer expert advice in the 
development of radiation monitoring at borders, 
including training for Customs officers.
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A major goal of all current Comprehensive 
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) related activi-
ties is the entry into force of the CTBT itself. To 
reach this goal, major steps have to be taken in 
the political arena, and an important prerequisite 
for positive political action is that the verification 
system of the CTBTO is functioning and able to 
provide assurance to all parties that it is impos-
sible to make a clandestine nuclear test without 
detection. The FiNDC is committed to its own role 
in the common endeavour so that the verification 
system of the CTBTO can accomplish its detection 
task. While still incomplete, the verification system 
has already demonstrated its ability to detect nu-
clear tests.
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7 Abbreviations and acronyms
ADR
European Agreement 
concerning the International 
Carriage of Dangerous Goods 
by Road
AP
Additional Protocol to the 
Safeguards Agreement
AQG
Atomic Questions Group of 
the Council of the European 
Union
ASTOR
Application of Safeguards to 
Geological Repositories
BTC
Basic Technical 
Characteristics
CA
Complementary Access
CBRN
Chemical, biological, 
radiological and nuclear 
(such as in “protective 
measures taken against 
CBRN weapons or hazards”)
CdZnTe
Cadmium zinc telluride
CTBT
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-
Ban Treaty
CTBTO
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-
Ban Treaty Organization
DIQ
Design Information 
Questionnaire
DIV
Design Information 
Verification
DU
Depleted uranium
eFORK
enhanced FORK with a 
CdZnTe-gamma spectrometer 
(see FORK)
ES
Environmental Sampling
ESARDA
European Safeguards 
Research and Development 
Association
EU
European Union
FA
(1) Facility Attachment 
according to the Safeguards 
Agreement (INFCIRC/193), 
(2) Fuel Assembly
FiNDC
Finnish National Data 
Centre for the CTBT
FINSP
Finnish Support Programme 
to the IAEA Safeguards
FORK
Spent fuel verifier with 
gross gamma and neutron 
detection
GBUV
Gamma Burnup Verifier
GICNT
Global Initiative for 
Combating Nuclear 
Terrorism
HEU
High-enriched uranium
HPGe
High-Purity Germanium
IAEA
International Atomic Energy 
Agency
IMS
International Monitoring 
System (of the CTBTO)
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INFCIRC
Information Circular 
(IAEA document type, eg. 
INFCIRC/193, Safeguards 
Agreement, or INFCIRC/140, 
the Non-Proliferation Treaty)
INMM
Institute of Nuclear 
Materials Management 
IPPAS
International Physical 
Protection Advisory Service
IRRS
Integrated Regulatory 
Review Service
IS
Integrated Safeguards
ISSAS
International SSAC Advisory 
Service
ITU
Institute of Transuranium 
Elements in Karlsruhe
ITWG
International Technical 
Working Group for combating 
illicit trafficking of nuclear 
and other radioactive 
materials
JRC
The Joint Research Centre
KMP
Key Measurement Point
LEU
Low-enriched uranium
LINSSI
an SQL database for gamma-
ray spectrometry
MBA
Material Balance Area
MEE
Ministry of Employment and 
the Economy
MFA
Ministry for Foreign Affairs
NDA
Non-Destructive Assay
NM
Nuclear Material
NPP
Nuclear Power Plant
NPT
The Treaty on the Non-
proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons (INFCIRC/140, 
“Non-Proliferation Treaty”)
NSG
Nuclear Suppliers’ Group
NRC
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission
OECD/NEA
Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and 
Development /Nuclear 
Energy Agency
Onkalo
Underground rock 
characterisation facility (for 
the final disposal of spent 
nuclear fuel)
PGET
Passive Gamma Emission 
Tomography
PIT
Physical Inventory Taking
PIV
Physical Inventory 
Verification
PSP
Particular Safeguards 
Provisions
PTS
Provisional Technical 
Secretariat (to the 
Preparatory Commission of 
the CTBT)
Pu
Plutonium
RL07
Radionuclide Laboratory 
in the CTBT IMS network 
hosted by STUK (FIL07)
SA
Subsidiary Arrangements
SFAT
Spent Fuel Attribute Tester
SNRCU
State Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission of Ukraine
SNRI
Short Notice Random 
Inspection
SNRIU
State Nuclear Regulatory 
Inspectorate of Ukraine
SNUICA
Short notice, unannounced 
inspection, complementary 
access, on-alert inspector
SSAC
State System of Accounting 
for and Control of Nuclear 
Materials
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SSM
Swedish Radiation Safety 
Authority
Th
Thorium
U
Uranium
UI
Unannounced Inspection
UNSC
United Nations Security 
Council
VTT
Technical Research Centre of 
Finland
WGB
Working Group B (of the 
CTBTO)
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Table A1. Summary of nuclear fuel receipts in 2014.
To From FA LEU (kg)
Olkiluoto 1, W0L1 Germany 110 19 181
Olkiluoto 2, W0L2 (1/2) Sweden 110 19 047
Loviisa NPP, WL0V Russian Federation 162 20 314
 FA = fuel assembly; LEU = low-enriched uranium. 
APPENDIX 1 Nuclear materials in Finland in 2014
Table A2. Fuel assemblies at 31 December 2014.
MBA FA/SFA *) LEU (kg) Pu (kg)
Olkiluoto 1, W0L1 1 223/631 209 056 997
Olkiluoto 2, W0L2 1 242/666 207 214 1 000
Olkiluoto, spent fuel 
storage, W0LS
7 007/7 007 1 183 718 9 977
Loviisa NPP, WL0V 5 631/4 849 654 914 6 007
MBA = material balance area, FA = fuel assembly, SFA = spent fuel assembly
*) Fuel assemblies (FA) in core are accounted as fresh fuel assemblies  
(Loviisa NPP 313 FAs and Olkiluoto NPP 500 FAs per reactor)
Table A3. Total amounts of nuclear material at 31 December 2014.
MBA Natural U (kg) Enriched U* (kg) Depleted U (kg) Plutonium (kg) Thorium (kg)
W0L1 – 209 102 – 998 –
W0L2 – 207 260 – 1 001 –
W0LS – 1 183 718 – 9 977 –
WL0V – 654 915 – 6 007 –
WRRF 1 511 60.098 0.002 < 0.001 0.044
WFRS 0.632 0.537 369.0 ~ 0 0.220
WKK0 2 709.7 – – – –
WNNH 2 623.55 – – – –
WHEL 49.716 0.293 20.010 0.003 2.942
Minor holders 0.834 0.00116 1 179.2 ~ 0 0.341
MBA = material balance area, WRRF = VTT  Research Reactor, WFRS = STUK, WKK0 = Freeport Cobalt Oy, in Kokkola, WNNH = Norilsk Nickel Harjavalta,  
WHEL = Laboratory of Radiochemistry at the University of Helsinki, U = uranium. *) Less than 150 g of high-enriched uranium, mainly used in detectors.
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APPENDIX 2 Safeguards field activities in 2014
General information Inspections Inspection  person days
MBA Date Inspection type IAEA COM STUK IAEA COM STUK
W0L2 12 February SNRI 1 1 1 1 1 2
W0LF 20 February As built DIV 0 0 1 0 0 1
WHEL 5 March PIV, site check 0 1 2 0 1 2
WL0V 6 March Extra (change of surveillance system  memory cards) 0 1 1 0 1 1
S SF VTT1 16 March Site check 0 0 1 0 0 1
S SF P0S1 19 March Site check 0 0 1 0 0 1
S SF STUK 19 March Site check 0 0 1 0 0 1
W0L1, W0LS 3 April Interim inspection, site check 0 0 3 0 0 3
WL0V 3 April Interim inspection, site check 0 0 2 0 0 2
W0LF (Posiva) 23–24 April System inspection (management system, safeguards with security) 0 0 1 0 0 4
W0L1,W0L2 29–30 April Pre-PIT 2 2 2 2 2 2
W0LS 21 May SNRI 1 1 1 1 1 1
W0L1 26 May OL1 core verification 0 0 1 0 0 1
W0L2 7 June OL2 core verification 0 0 1 0 0 1
W0L1, W0L2 12 June PIV (BTC review) 2 2 2 2 2 2
WL0V 12 June Interim inspection 0 0 1 0 0 2
W0L1,W0L2, W0LS 25–26 June W0LS PIV + EOSS/DSOS service in W0L1/W0L2 3 3 3 6 3 3
WL0V 8–10 July RDT equipment installation (replacement of DSOS with NGSS) 1 1 1 3 3 5
WL0V 15–17 July Pre-PIT 1 1 1 3 3 3
WL0V 28 July Lo1 core verification 0 0 1 0 0 1
WL0V 21 August Transfer cask verification in Lo2 1 1 1 1 1 1
WL0V 23 August Transfer cask verification in Lo2 1 1 1 1 1 1
W0LS 2 September Pond covering (extra) 1 1 1 1 1 1
WL0V 3 September Transfer cask verification in Lo2 1 1 1 1 1 1
WL0V 6 September Lo2 core verification 0 0 1 0 0 2
WL0V 1-2 October Post PIT, DIV 1 1 1 2 2 2
WRRF 3 October PIV 0 1 1 0 1 2
WL0V (Fortum) 8-9 October System inspection (management system, safeguards with security) 0 0 1 0 0 5
W0LS 4 November Pond covering (extra) 1 1 1 1 1 1
W0L3 5 November DIV 1 1 1 1 1 1
W0LF 3-7 November DIV 1 1 1 13 15 5
W0L1 10 December Interim inspection 0 0 1 0 0 1
WFRS (STUK) 10 December System inspection 0 0 1 0 0 1
NDA MEASUREMENTS
WL0V 13–17 January PGET (also as equipment test, IAEA and EC as observers) 1 1 1 5 5 5
W0L2 4–6 November GBUV 0 0 1 0 0 3
TOTAL 20 23 43 44 46 72
Note: At the Olkiluoto NPP, inspections are counted per MBA. MBA = material balance area, PIV = Physical Inventory Verification, CV = Core Verification,  
CA = Complementary Access, ES = Environmental Sampling, NM = nuclear material, SFAT/eFORK/GBUV = methods of non-destructive assay.
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APPENDIX 3 International agreements and national 
legislation relevant to nuclear safeguards in Finland
Valid legislation, treaties and agreements concern-
ing safeguards of nuclear materials and other nu-
clear items at the end of 2014 in Finland (Finnish 
Treaty Series, FTS):
1. The Nuclear Energy Act, 11 December, 1987/990 
as amended.
2. The Nuclear Energy Decree, 12 February, 
1988/161 as amended.
3. The Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons INFCIRC/140 (FTS 11/70).
4. The Agreement with the Kingdom of Belgium, 
the Kingdom of Denmark, the Federal Republic 
of Germany, Ireland, the Italian Republic, the 
Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom 
of Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy 
Community and the International Atomic En-
ergy Agency in Implementation of Article III, 
(1) and (4) of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons (INFCIRC/193), 14 September 
1997. Valid for Finland from 1 October 1995.
5. The Protocol Additional to the Agreement be-
tween the Republic of Austria, the Kingdom of 
Belgium, the Kingdom of Denmark, the Federal 
Republic of Germany, the Hellenic Republic, Ire-
land, the Italian Republic, the Grand Duchy of 
Luxembourg, the Kingdom of Netherlands, the 
Portuguese Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the 
Kingdom of Sweden, the European Atomic En-
ergy Community and the International Atomic 
Energy Agency in Implementation of Article iii, 
(1) and (4) of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons, 22 September 1998. Entered 
into force on 30 April 2004.
6. The Treaty establishing the European Atom-
ic Energy Community (Euratom Treaty), 25 
March 1957:
•	 Regulation	No	5,	amendment	of	the	list	in	
Attachment VI, 22 December 1958
•	 Regulation	No	9,	article	197,	point	4	of	the	
Euratom Treaty, on determining concentra-
tions of ores, 2 February 1960.
7. Commission Regulation (Euratom) No 302/2005, 
8 February 2005
8. Council Regulation (EC) No 428/2009 setting up 
a Community regime for the control of exports, 
transfer, brokering, and transit of dual use 
items.
9. The Agreement with the Government of the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland and the Government of the Republic of 
Finland for Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses 
of Atomic Energy (FTS 16/69). Articles I, II, III 
and X expired on 20 February 1999.
10. The Agreement with the Government of the 
Russian Federation (the Soviet Union signed) 
and the Government of the Republic of Finland 
for Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Atomic 
Energy (FTS 39/69). Articles 1, 2, 3 and 11 ex-
pired on 1.12.2004.
11. The Agreement between the Government of 
the Kingdom of Sweden and the Government of 
the Republic of Finland for Co-operation in the 
Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy 580/70 (FTS 
41/70). Articles 1, 2 and 3 expired on 5.9.2000.
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12. The Agreement between Sweden and Finland 
concerning guidelines on export of nuclear ma-
terials, technology and equipment (FTS 20/83).
13. The Agreement between the Government of Re-
public of Finland and the Government of Cana-
da and Canada concerning the uses of nuclear 
materials, equipment, facilities and information 
transferred between Finland and Canada (FTS 
43/76). Substituted to the appropriate extent by 
the Agreement with the Government of Canada 
and the European Atomic Energy Community 
(Euratom) in the peaceful Uses of Atomic En-
ergy, 6 October 1959 as amended.
14. The Agreement on implementation of the Agree-
ment with Finland and Canada concerning the 
uses of nuclear materials, equipment, facilities 
and information transferred between Finland 
and Canada (FTS 43/84).
15. The Agreement between the Government of Re-
public of Finland and the Government of Aus-
tralia concerning the transfer of nuclear mate-
rial between Finland and Australia (FTS2/80). 
Substituted to the appropriate extent by the 
Agreement between the Government of Aus-
tralia and the European Atomic Energy Com-
munity concerning transfer of nuclear material 
from Australia to the European Atomic Energy 
Community.
16. The Agreement for Cooperation with the Gov-
ernment of the Republic of Finland and the 
Government of the United States concerning 
Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (FTS 37/92). 
Substituted to the appropriate extent by the 
Agreement for Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses 
of Nuclear Energy with European Atomic En-
ergy Community and the USA.
17. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 
(FTS 15/2001). This treaty was ratified by Fin-
land in 2001, but will not enter into force before 
it is ratified by all 44 states listed in Annex II of 
the treaty.
